Category Archives: Product Liability

Litigation, Manufacturing, Metals, Negligence, Product Liability, Railroad, Steel

Product Liability Issues Arising From Rail Car Wheel Cracking and Fatigue

Olson Brooksby PC, product liability and railroad lawyers

Rail car wheel cracking and fatigue can lead to significant product liability exposure and potential negligence claims.  Unless specifically exempted by another statute or federal regulation, Oregon’s product liability statutes, starting at ORS 30.900, govern product liability actions in Oregon, including products such as railroad car wheels.  This article will explore three important studies regarding rail wheel cracking and fatigue issues and will end by discussing critical product liability issues associated with rail wheels.  In rail wheel cases, the phenomena commonly known as rolling contact fatigue (“RCF”) can lead to cracking and even the uncontrolled discharge of portions or rail car wheels.  In extreme circumstances, the wheel itself may be subject to vertical cracking and disintegration.

Rail Car Wheel Cracking:  Three Scientific Studies

There is a vast body peer-reviewed scientific literature that examines the relationship between various manufacturing processes, uses and stresses on railway wheels, and metal fatigue and cracking.  This article explores three such scientific studies that focus on the susceptibility of railway wheels to wear and RCF damage.  As explained in further detail below, studies have found that rail wheel damage is influenced by the properties of the wheel material, including steel composition and hardening techniques.

Below there are links to each study discussed.  If, however, you cannot access the links and would like to review the studies, please contact Olson Brooksby.

The Molyneux-Berry, Davis, and Bevan Study

This study examined railway wheels on fleets from the UK and concluded that the materials that make up the wheels themselves influence the amount of wear and RCF damage that the wheels are subjected to.  Factors that contribute to wheel damage are the composition of the steel, the process by which wheels are manufactured, and loading during operation.

This study can be found here: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3914578/

The Liu, Stratman, Mahadevan Study

This study developed a 3D “multiaxial fatigue life prediction model” to calculate the life of a rail car wheel and to assist with predictions regarding the timeline of its fatigue.

This study can be found here: http://yongming.faculty.asu.edu/paper/fatiwheels-ijf.pdf

The Peixoto and Ferreira Study

In this study, fatigue crack growth rate behavior tests were performed according to ASTM E647 (2008).  The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of accurate models that predict fatigue problems in rail car wheels in order to assist with maintenance and safety standards.

This study can be found here: http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/emerald-publishing/fatigue-crack-propagation-behavior-in-railway-steels-6SBquFt7Pn

Defenses to Rail Wheel Product Liability Claims

A common issue in rail wheel cases is the age of the wheel at issue and the amount of use it has received.  When an older wheel is involved, defense counsel for the manufacturer should look first for a defense based on statute of ultimate repose.  ORS 30.905 provides for a ten year statute of repose.  If the plaintiff does not file a claim for personal injury or property damage within ten years from the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption, the claim is barred.  Oregon has a strong statute of ultimate repose.  There are no “useful safe life” or other exceptions or rebuttable presumptions codified in the statute that provides for an absolute ten years.

Absent an ability to obtain a complete dismissal under the statute of ultimate repose, the three studies discussed above illustrate the variety of causation factors and scientific models concerning rail car fatigue issues.  Manufacturing materials and processes, steel fabrication techniques and materials for both wheels and rails, the nature of the loads, gradients, and cycles are all among the factors that provide fertile ground for defending rail wheel claims.

Product Liability

Scott Brooksby recognized as Business Edition “Super Lawyer” for Product Liability

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Scott Brooksby has been recognized as Business Edition “Super Lawyer” in the 2013 Business Edition of Super Lawyers for product liability defense. Scott has been recognized as one of the top attorneys in product liability defense commercial practice, selected from attorneys across the nation and in London.

Scott Brooksby is experienced in defending companies of all sizes against product liability claims–from small franchisees to Fortune 500 companies.  Scott is aware of the needs of different-sized companies facing issues like product recalls and compliance issues.

Scott has handled product liability cases in both state and federal courts.  He is intimately familiar with the various applicable state and federal regulations that apply in product liability cases, and he serves as on-demand counselors for his clients as issues come up. He also assists his product liability clients with insurance issues, employment and temporary worker concerns, and contract analysis.

Scott has extensive experience with product liability law through decades of representing national and international manufacturers, sellers, distributors, and suppliers.  He is a trial lawyer who provides sound recommendations to his clients regarding when to settle and when to try product liability cases, and how to minimize risk and avoid future claims.

Scott works efficiently with a wide variety of the nation’s most recognized product liability experts regarding complicated factual and medical issues.  He is familiar with federal and state product liability law and regulations, and he works with his clients to determine the best defense strategy when faced with a product liability lawsuit or potential lawsuit.

Three types of product defects are recognized in Oregon: design defects, manufacturing defects, and failure to warn.  Scott has defended companies against all three types of product defect claims and have successfully challenged product liability cases pleaded under both negligence and strict liability theories.

Aviation, aviation attorney, aviation attorney, aviation, aviation law, aviation lawyer, aviation law, aviation lawyer, Evidence, Litigation, Multiple Defendants, Negligence, Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Pleadings, Product Liability, Uncategorized

Multi-Defendant Product Liability and Aviation Cases Under the Lasley Case

Close up of judge raising gavel in courtroom

Lasley: A road map for pleading claims related to the fault of other defendants

Olson Brooksby PC often represents one or more defendants In multi-defendant product liability actions and aviation cases.  The Oregon Supreme Court case of Lasley v Combined Transport, Inc., 351 Or 1 (2011), addressed the issue of causation in Oregon as it relates to negligence cases with multiple tortfeasors.  Lasley also contains a detailed analysis regarding allocation of fault.  It is instructive for defendants who have affirmative defenses relating to the fault of other parties, as well as cross-claims and indemnity and contribution claims against each other.

For example, in multi-party product liability and aviation cases, more often than not, there will be a two or more co-defendants who intend to present a unified, or at least not inconsistent, defense against the target defendant.

Lasley contains a road map for defendants in such cases and sets out how to properly plead claims concerning the fault of other defendants so that those claims may be appropriately considered by the jury.

 What happened in Lasley?

In the Lasley case, a truck owned by defendant Combined Transport lost part of its load of panes of glass on the I-5 freeway.  Id. at 4.  The plaintiff in the case was among those stopped in traffic on the freeway while the glass dropped by defendant Combined Transport was being cleaned up.  Id.  While the plaintiff was stopped, Clemmer, the other defendant in the case, hit plaintiff’s pickup truck.  Id.  Defendant Clemmer was allegedly driving while intoxicated.  The collision caused a gas leak from the plaintiff’s pickup which, in turn, caused a fire, killing the plaintiff.  Id.  The lawsuit against Clemmer and Combined Transport alleged “that Clemmer was negligent in driving at an excessive speed and in failing to keep a proper lookout and control of her car.”  Id. at 13.  Clemmer admitted fault.  Id.  Critically, “Plaintiff did not allege that Clemmer was negligent in driving while intoxicated.”  Id.

Based on these pleadings, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that Clemmer was intoxicated at the time of the collision, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict against both defendants, finding Combined Transport 22% at fault and Clemmer 78% at fault for plaintiff’s damages.  Id. at 4.

On appeal, Combined Transport argued that the court should have allowed evidence of Clemmer’s negligence due to her intoxication because Combined Transport filed an answer including a general denial and filed a cross-claim against Clemmer for contribution based on negligence due to intoxication.   Id. at 13-14.  Specifically, Combined Transport alleged that Clemmer should “contribute such amount as is proportionate to her share.”  Id. at 23.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   However, “Combined Transport did not allege in its cross-claim that it had paid more than its proportional share of liability or seek a money judgment against Clemmer.”  Id.  (Bolding added.)    The plaintiff argued that evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication was properly excluded because the plaintiff did not allege that Clemmer was negligent in driving while intoxicated, and, therefore, Clemmer’s intoxication was not relevant to apportionment as framed by the pleadings.  Id. at 13.

The court explained that Combined Transport should have included allegations of Clemmer’s negligence due to intoxication and Clemmer’s responsibility for contribution in Combined Transport’s answer as an affirmative defense.  Id. at 23.  The court held that:

“[A] defendant that does not allege that it has paid more than its proportional share of liability and that does not seek a separate judgment against a codefendant for the amount of that excess payment, but that instead seeks to avoid paying the full damages that a plaintiff has alleged on the basis that a codefendant is more at fault in a way that was not alleged by the plaintiff, must plead the specification of negligence on which the defendant relies as an affirmative defense in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint and not in a separate cross-claim against the codefendant.”  

Id. at 22-23.

As explained below, however, the court treated the Lasley case in a special way and allowed the cross-claim to be treated as an affirmative defense. Id. at 26. Most defendants in other multi-party cases, however, probably will not be so lucky.

Also, as explained below, the court went through a lengthy analysis of causation and negligence law in Oregon, and it also set out some critical Oregon-specific pleading rules in multi-defendant cases.

Causation in negligence cases involving multiple defendants under Lasley

The Lasley court stated that, in Oregon, “when the negligence of multiple tortfeasors combines to produce harm, each tortfeasor whose negligence was a cause of the harm may be held liable.”  Id. at 6. Oregon law focuses on factual cause.  Id. at 7.  The Oregon Supreme Court “has abolished not only the terms but also the concepts of ‘proximate’ and ‘legal’ cause.”  Id. at 6.   Factually, if the defendant’s negligence harmed the plaintiff, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff as long as the injuries that the plaintiff suffered were reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s negligence.  Id. at 7.  Therefore, causation is “a purely factual matter” and is separate from the concept of liability (which is determined by whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable–not by ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ cause).  Id.

Under Oregon law, causation is determined based on the “substantial factor” test and is evaluated by looking at “causation in fact.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  If the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the harm that befell the plaintiff, the causation element is met.  Id.  The question is “whether someone examining the event without regard to legal consequences would conclude that the allegedly faulty conduct or condition in fact played a role in its occurrence.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In Lasley, Combined Transport argued that its conduct was so minimal when compared to Clemmer’s that its conduct could not have been a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s death.  Id. at 8.  Specifically, Combined Transport argued that the trial court should have admitted evidence that Clemmer was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that, when compared to Clemmer’s egregious conduct, Combined Transport’s conduct was so minimal that it should not be held liable.

The court admitted that a case might exist where the causation element is met as to the first defendant such that the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred absent that first defendant’s negligence.  However, that first defendant’s act was so insignificant when compared to the act of the second defendant that the first defendant should not be held liable.  Id. at 10.  But the court declined to address such a circumstance, finding that those facts were not at issue in Lasley.  Id.

Rather, the court held that, “both the conduct of Clemmer and the conduct of Combined Transport were substantial factors in contributing to decedent’s death.”  Id.  Clemmer admitted fault and the jury found that Combined Transport’s act of spilling the glass on I-5 caused the plaintiff to stop.  Id. at 11.  There was expert testimony that, had the decedent’s pickup been moving at the time of the impact, the pickup would not have ignited and the plaintiff would not have died.  Id.

The court found that, even if the trial court had admitted evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication, Combined Transport’s conduct would not have been any less significant based on the evidence at trial.  Id. at 11.  The court reasoned that, “In deciding whether a defendant’s act is a factual cause of a plaintiff’s harm, the effect of the defendant’s conduct, and not whether that conduct fell below the expected standard of care, is the relevant consideration.”  Id.  Therefore, even if Clemmer was not intoxicated and did not engage in any negligent conduct, but still hit the decedent’s pickup while it was stopped, Clemmer’s conduct would have been a factual cause of the decedent’s harm.  Id.  The court explained that Combined Transport’s argument confused “causation” and “negligence.”  Id.  In other words, even if the trial court had introduced evidence regarding Clemmer’s intoxication, that would simply show “an additional way in which Clemmer deviated from the standard of care, it could not prove an additional way in which Clemmer contributed to the chain of events that caused decedent’s death.”  Id.  The focus is on “the effect of the defendant’s conduct, and not whether that conduct fell below the expected standard of care * * *.”  Id.  The court conceded that its analysis may have been different had Combined Transport proffered “evidence that showed that, because Clemmer was intoxicated, she inevitably would have killed decedent, even if his pickup had not been stationary.”  Id. at 12.  However, that argument was not made by Combined Transport at trial.

Apportionment of fault in multi-defendant cases under Lasley

Under Oregon law, when the fact finder determines that multiple defendants were at fault, the fact finder must apportion fault, based on percentages that equal 100, between those defendants.  Id. at 13.  The fact finder “is required to compare the degree to which each defendant deviated from the standard of care and is therefore ‘blameworthy.'”  Id.

The plaintiff in Lasley argued that Clemmer’s intoxication was not relevant to the fault of the parties “as framed by the pleadings” because the plaintiff did not make such an allegation in his Complaint.  Id.

Combined Transport argued that evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication should have been allowed because Combined Transport’s Answer included a general denial and it also cross-claimed against Clemmer for contribution on the basis of Clemmer’s intoxication.  Id. at 13-14.

The court held that:

“in a comparative negligence case, a defendant that seeks to rely on a specification of negligence not alleged by the plaintiff to establish a codefendant’s proportional share of fault must affirmatively plead that specification of negligence and do so in its answer as an affirmative defense and not in a cross-claim for contribution.”

Id. at 14.

The court found that, under the unique facts of Lasley, Combined Transport’s cross-claim could be construed as an affirmative defense alleging that Clemmer was negligent by driving under the influence.  Id.  The court therefore held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication.  Id.  It is important to note that the court stressed that Lasley was a very unique case and was almost a “one-off” exception to the holding that specific facts underlying a negligence claim not pleaded by a plaintiff must be pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense if the defendant wants to rely on those facts at trial.  As a rule, such facts should not be pled as a cross-claim for contribution.  In other words, “a defendant that intends to rely on a specification of negligence not pleaded by a plaintiff must affirmatively plead those facts to make them admissible.”  Id. at 15.  (Bolding added.)

The court explained that Combined Transport’s general denial was not sufficient to put into issue facts that the plaintiff had not pleaded in his Complaint.  Id. at 17.  A general denial only allows for evidence that contradicts “facts necessary to be proved by plaintiff * * *.”  Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In contrast, an affirmative defense pleads “a new matter” that “does not directly controvert a fact necessary to be established by plaintiff * * *.”   Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A “new matter” consists of facts “different from those averred by the plaintiff and not embraced within the judicial inquiry into their truth.”  Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In other words, “When a defendant seeks to avoid liability for the damages that a plaintiff claims by asserting that a codefendant engaged in more blameworthy negligent conduct not pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant relies for that defensive posture on facts different from those averred by the plaintiff.”  Id.  

The court held that:

“a defendant that does not allege that it has paid more than its proportional share of liability and that does not seek a separate judgment against a codefendant for the amount of that excess payment, but that instead seeks to avoid paying the full damages that a plaintiff has alleged on the basis that a codefendant is more at fault in a way that was not alleged by the plaintiff, must plead the specification of negligence on which the defendant relies as an affirmative defense in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint and not in a separate cross-claim against the codefendant.”  

Id. at 22-23.

Under the facts of Lasley, “Combined Transport did not allege in its cross-claim that it had paid more than its proportional share of liability or seek a money judgment against Clemmer.”  Id. at 23.  Rather, Combined Transport alleged that Clemmer was driving while intoxicated and that Clemmer should “‘contribute such amount as is proportionate to her share.'”  Id.  The court found that Combined Transport should have made those allegations as an affirmative defense.  Id.

However, the court noted that:

“Combined Transport did allege, in its cross-claim, the fact of Clemmer’s intoxication and its theory that Clemmer’s intoxication should be considered in determining Clemmer’s proportional share of liability.  Combined Transport was incorrect in selecting the pleading that it was required to use, but was correct in recognizing that it must plead those allegations to make Clemmer’s intoxication relevant to the jury’s determination of comparative fault.  The trial court was correct that a cross-claim for contribution was premature, but it was incorrect that there was no role for Combined Transport’s pleading alleging negligence by Clemmer that was not pleaded by plaintiff.  A pleading was necessary to make Clemmer’s intoxication material and to allow the jury to consider that conduct in comparing the fault of Clemmer and Combined Transport.”

Id. at 26.  

Therefore, the court held that, “in the unique circumstances of this case, the cross-claim that Combined Transport proffered fulfilled the function of an affirmative defense, viz., to put the plaintiff on notice of the theory and facts comprising the defendant’s defense.”  Id. (bolding added).  The court found it significant that, at the time of trial, it was unclear (due to the trial court’s rulings) which pleading Combined Transport was required to use and Combined Transport’s cross-claim did apprise the plaintiff “of the facts on which it intended to rely and the purpose of those facts.  In that narrow circumstance, the defect in designating the pleading as a cross-claim rather than as an affirmative defense did not affect the substantial rights of plaintiff.”  Id. at 27 (bolding added).

The court added that, “However, for the reasons we have stated, the evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication was not relevant on the issues of causation, liability, or damages.  Therefore, we remand the case for a new trial limited to the degree of fault of each defendant ‘expressed as a percentage of the total fault’ attributable to each defendant.”  Id. at 27.

Pleading requirements and rules for defendants who want to ensure that fault is allocated to another party

The court also spelled out additional pleading requirements under Oregon law when a defendant wants to ensure that fault is allocated to another party:

– “When a defendant seeks to avoid liability to the plaintiff by asserting that the plaintiff or another tortfeasor should be held responsible for the plaintiff’s damages, Oregon law also anticipates that the defendant will alternatively plead the facts on which it relies.”  Id. at 16.

– “When a defendant contends that the plaintiff was at fault, the defendant must affirmatively plead ‘comparative or contributory negligence’ in its answer as an affirmative defense.  ORCP 19 B.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 16.

– “When a defendant contends that a tortfeasor who has not been joined in the action or with whom the plaintiff has settled was at fault, the defendant must file a third-party complaint against the tortfeasor or otherwise affirmatively allege the fault of that tortfeasor. ORS 31.600(3).”  Lasley, 351 Or at 16.

– “When a defendant contends that a codefendant was at fault, the defendant also must affirmatively allege the unpleaded fault of the codefendant.  * * *  ORCP 19 B requires that a party set forth affirmatively allegations of ‘comparative negligence.’  That requirement is not limited to allegations of the comparative negligence of a plaintiff.  Lasley, 351 Or at 16-17.

– “ORCP 19 B requires a defendant to set forth affirmatively ‘any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.'”  Lasley, 351 Or at 17.

– “A general denial is required to ‘fairly meet the substance of the allegations denied.’  ORCP 19 A.  Therefore, a general denial does not put at issue facts that a plaintiff has not pleaded.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 17.

– Under ORS 31.600(3) and ORCP 19 B, “a defendant must, in some way, affirmatively plead a specification of negligence on which it intends to rely, and that has not been pleaded by the plaintiff, to establish the fault of a codefendant.  A general denial wil not permit a defendant to adduce evidence of a codefendant’s unpleaded negligence to avoid liability to the plaintiff.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 17.

– “[T]he proportional share of fault of each tortfeasor will be determined in the negligence action brought by the plaintiff.”  Id. at 18.

– Oregon no longer has joint and several liability.  “Now, under ORS 31.610, liability is several only; a tortfeasor is responsible only for its percentage of fault as determined in the action brought by the plaintiff.”   Lasley, 351 Or at 19.

– Under Oregon’s comparative negligence law, “no tortfeasor is liable for more than its percentage of fault, and that percentage of fault is determined in the original negligence action brought by the plaintiff.  ORS 31.610(2); ORS 31.805.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 21.

– “A defendant cannot bring a contribution action to seek a different determination of its percentage of fault.  A contribution action serves only to permit a defendant who has ‘paid more’ than its ‘proportional share of the common liability’ to obtain contribution from another person who is also liable for the same injury or death.  ORS 31.800(2).”  Lasley, 351 Or at 21.

– Although Oregon law allows for contribution claims under ORS 31.800(2), “Because a defendant’s liability is several only and the defendant is not obligated to pay more than its proportional share of liability, it seems that the circumstances in which a defendant will pay more than its proportional share and, therefore, have a reason to seek contribution from a codefendant will be quite limited.”   Lasley, 351 Or at 21.

– If a defendant does pay more than its proportional share and has a reason to seek contribution from a codefendant, that defendant “could use a cross-claim to assert a claim for contribution against a codefendant.  ORCP 22 B defines a cross-claim as a claim ‘existing in favor of the defendant asserting the cross-claim and against another defendant, between whom a separate judgment might be had in the action [.]’  A defendant who ‘has paid’ its proportional share could seek a separate judgment against a codefendant for the excess amount of its payment and do so by means of a cross-claim.”   Lasley, 351 Or at 21.

– A cross-clam for contribution should not be used “by a defendant to allege that a co-defendant is at fault for the plaintiff’s damages and should be held liable, not to the defendant, but to the plaintiff.  In that instance, the defendant does not seek a separate judgment against the codefendant as required by ORCP 22 B.  Even so, the comparative negligence statutes indicate that such a pleading may be permitted.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 21.

– “[W]hen a plaintiff does not join a tortfeasor as a defendant, the comparative negligence statutes permit the named defendant to file a third-party complaint against the tortfeasor.  ORS 31.600(3).  In that instance, the third-party defendant will not be liable to the defendant but, potentially, will be liable to the plaintiff.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 22.

– “ORCP 22 C(1) restricts third-party claims to circumstances in which a third party ‘is or may be liable to the third party plaintiff.'”  Lasley, 351 Or at 22.

– Even though ORCP 22 C(1) “indicates that a third-party claim is designed for the circumstance in which the third-party defendant is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff, ORS 31.600(3) permits a defendant to file a third-party complaint to allege that a third-party defendant is at fault and potentially liable to the plaintiff.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 22.

– “ORS 31.600(2) specifically provides that the fact that a plaintiff is not a party to the third-party claim does not pervent the trier of fact from comparing the fault of the third-party defendant in the action brought by the plaintiff.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 22.

– “[T]he legislature anticipated that a defendant could file a third-party complaint against a tortfeasor who would not be liable to the defendant but who could, instead, be liable to the plaintiff.  Whether the legislature intended to permit a defendant to make a cross-claim against a codefendant who would not be liable to the defendant but, instead, would be liable to the plaintiff, is unclear.”  Id.  

– “Neither an affirmative defense nor a cross-claim for contribution is ideally designed as a mechanism for a defendant to plead the negligence of a codefendant that is not pleaded by the plaintiff and thereby to avoid or reduce the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff.  An affirmative defense is directed at a plaintiff, not at a codefendant.”  That said, “an affirmative defense is the pleading mechanism that a defendant should use.  The use of an affirmative defense is consistent with the terms of ORCP 19 B, whereas the use of a cross-claim for contribution would require modification of the terms of ORCP 22 B(1) and ORS 31.800.”  Lasley, 351 Or at 22.

– “We hold that a defendant that does not allege that it has paid more than its proportional share of liability and that does not seek a separate judgment against a codefendant for the amount of that excess payment, but that instead seek to avoid paying the full damages that a plaintiff has alleged on the basis that a codefendant is more at fault in a way that was not alleged by the plaintiff, must plead the specification of negligence on which the defendant relies as an affirmative defense in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint and not in a separate cross-claim against the codefendant.”  Id. at 22-23.

– A cross-claim for contribution is directed at a codefendant and is not designed to avoid liability to a plaintiff.  Id. at 22.

– “[A] defendant who wishes to have the jury consider the unpleaded negligence of a codefendant in making” the comparison of fault of the parties “is required to plead the facts establishing that negligence.  The fact that the codefendant has accepted liability based on the facts alleged by the plaintiff does not eliminate that requirement.  Thus, in this case, to have the jury consider evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication in comparing the fault of the parties, either plaintiff or Combined Transport had to allege those facts.  Plaintiff did not do so, and the pleading burden fell on Combined Transport.”  Id. at 26.

 

Manufacturing, Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Uncategorized

Component Part Manufacturer Liability in Oregon

Oregon Did Not Adopt Caveat (3) In Its Adoption of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965)

Component part liability is important in products liability cases and especially in aviation cases, where the aircraft may have a long air-frame life but require service or replacements of hundreds of parts over its years of service.  Although Oregon adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A contains a caveat (Caveat 3 (1965)) regarding whether strict liability should be extended to component part manufacturers.  The Oregon Legislature, however, did not adopt this caveat as an interpretive guide for the courts.  Therefore, both pre-codification and post-codification Oregon Supreme Court rulings hold that strict liability can extend to component part manufacturers for the sale of defective components.  See State ex rel Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or 381 (1982); Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 269 Or 643 (1974) (fabric manufacturer held liable because of flammable character of fabric, even though fabric was sold to the coat manufacturer before reaching consumer).  If the component part is dangerously defective and it causes injury, the component part manufacturer (or seller or distributor) is subject to liability.

Oregon law also follows the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which takes the position that if the component part is defective and causes injury, the component part manufacturer (or seller or distributor) is subject to liability.  Additionally, if the component part manufacturer “substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product,” the component manufacturer is subject to liability. Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability § 5 (1998).

Oregon Law Involving Alleged Misapplication of a Raw Material:  Misapplication of a Raw Material Does Not Give Rise To Liability As To the Supplier

The manufacturer of a component part, however, is not subject to strict liability if the component was misapplied rather than defectively designed.  In Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 134 Or App 271 (1995), after experiencing problems with her temporomandibular joint (TMJ), the joint that connects the jaw bone to the skull, the plaintiff, Hoyt, had a prosthetic device implanted in her jaw.  The device gradually fragmented and released particles of Teflon, which caused a serious adverse reaction.  Du Pont Company manufactured Teflon and sold it to Vitek, Inc., which used the Teflon as a component part in its TMJ device.

Vitek designed, manufactured and marketed the device.  In 1977 DuPont informed Vitek that it manufactured Teflon for industrial purposes only and had sought no FDA rulings on the safety or effectiveness of surgical uses, and that Vitek would have to rely on its own medical and legal judgment.  Du Pont was aware of studies that warned of abrasion and fragmentation with medical Teflon implants and passed along this information to Vitek.  In 1983, Vitek received permission from the FDA to market the device pending “specific performance standards.”  Hoyt, supra, 134 Or App at 277.

Hoyt sued Du Pont, contending that Teflon was unreasonably dangerous because it was defectively designed and because of Du Pont’s failure to warn the medical community.  The court of appeals found that the component part was not defective.  The court of appeals also relied on the “raw material supplier” doctrine in deciding not to apply strict liability.  When a multiuse raw material is not unreasonably dangerous in itself, but becomes unreasonably dangerous when incorporated into certain uses, the supplier cannot be sued based on strict liability.  Hoyt, supra, 134 Or App at 284-286.  See Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F3d 701 (8th Cir 1993); Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F2d 45 (6th Cir 1989).

Cases in Which Component Parts Are the Allegedly Defective Product

Plaintiffs did allege that defective replacement parts were supplied after the first sale of a helicopter in Evans v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 1998 WL 1297138 (D Or 1998), but the service bulletins proffered by plaintiffs were insufficient to establish that the defective component parts were installed in the engine after the first sale.  The helicopter was manufactured in 1979, and crashed seventeen years later.  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis of ORS 30.905 because plaintiffs could not support their allegation that an affirmative misrepresentation occurred after the first sale of the helicopter by defendants.

In Allstate Indem. Co. v. Go Appliances LLC, 2006 WL 2045860 (D Or 2006), plaintiff alleged that a defective compressor installed on a used refrigerator caused a fire in its subrogor’s house.  The opinion does not state when the refrigerator was originally first sold and does not discuss product liability time limitations.  However, the court held that plaintiff could assert a products liability action against the defendant, who sold the used appliance and installed the allegedly defective new compressor.

The statute of ultimate repose in both strict product liability cases and negligence cases is beyond the scope of this article.  However, one of the controlling Oregon cases relevant to a replacement component part is Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 303 Or 281 (1987), mod. on recons. 303 Or 452.  Although Erickson discussed the application of the products liability statute of ultimate repose in the context of post-sale negligent misrepresentation, the case is relevant to a discussion regarding application of the statute of ultimate repose to a post- sale installation of a defective component part.

In Erickson, plaintiff purchased a helicopter in 1971.  Defendant allegedly made misrepresentations regarding the useful safe life of a compressor disc in 1977.  After the helicopter crashed in 1981 due to exhaustion of the compressor disc, plaintiff filed suit in 1983.  The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant was negligent in providing erroneous information, failing to warn plaintiff as to the erroneous information, and failing to warn that the helicopter was dangerous after expiration of the true safe life of the compressor disc.  Erickson, 303 Or at 284-85.

The Oregon Court of Appeals found that plaintiff’s action against the manufacturer was a product liability action, and that because the action was commenced more than eight years after the first purchase of the helicopter, the statute of ultimate repose barred the action.  Id. at 285-86.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:  “ORS 30.905 applies only to acts, omissions or conditions existing or occurring before or at the ‘date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption.’  Acts or omissions occurring after that date are governed by the statute of ultimate repose contained in ORS 12.115.”[1]  Id. at 286.  Because the defendant relayed the false information about the useful safe life of the compressor after the helicopter was first purchased, ORS 30.905 did not apply.  Id. at 289. (“The difference between the present case and the type of case that the legislature meant to cover under ORS 30.905(1) is that, in this negligence case, the reasonableness of certain of defendant’s actions after plaintiff’s purchase are in question while, in a product liability case governed by ORS 30.905, it is the condition of the article at the date of purchase that is in question.”) (emphasis in original).

The Erickson holding, when viewed in the context of installations of new components, supports the argument that such alterations cannot “restart” the statute of ultimate repose on the original product.  Erickson holds that ORS 30.905 only applies to “acts, omissions or conditions existing or occurring before or at the ‘date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption,’” and a post-sale negligent misrepresentation leading to the installation of a new product necessarily occurs after the date the product was first purchased.  A manufacturer can argue that under Erickson, the statute of ultimate repose should run on the original product from the date it entered the stream of commerce, regardless of whether component parts were installed post sale.

 

 

[1] ORS 12.115 is the generic statute of ultimate repose for negligence actions, and provides that “any action for negligent injury to person or property of another” must be commenced within “10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”

Aviation, DSM-5, Evidence, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Trials, Uncategorized

Key Changes to the DSM-5 for the Product Liability, Personal Injury, and Aviation Defense Lawyer

DSM-5 book

The creation of the fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was a massive undertaking that involved hundreds of psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians, and other medical professionals working together over a 12-year period.  The DSM-5, which replaced the 2000 DSM-IV (TR), is the foundation for reliable diagnosis and treatment of psychological and mental disorders.  As with prior DSM publications, which now date back decades, it is not intended to be a substitute for sound, objective clinical judgment, training, and skill.

Reflecting and prompted by the many new longitudinal studies, research papers, and experimental treatment modalities that have appeared since 2000, this new DSM edition contains significant changes in the classification of some disorders, and the removal or addition of other disorders.  This discussion will provide a brief overview of some of the key changes to the DSM-V and will touch on issues of interest to legal professionals working in the areas of product liability, personal injury, and aviation defense.

In a trial setting, familiarity with the DSM-5 and the underlying literature will be critical to an effective cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert.  Often, with forensic psychologists, the defense can make significant inroads on the basis that plaintiff’s expert is not sufficiently familiar with the DSM or associated literature.  For example, a significant new body of literature related to “resiliency and benefit realization” after a traumatic experience is largely unknown to most plaintiffs’ forensic psychologists.

A substantial percentage of high exposure cases in those categories involve a diagnosis of PTSD by plaintiff’s expert and a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score based on the five-level multiaxial system, with Axis 5 providing the GAF score.  This brief post will focus on the changes to ­– or more accurately, the elimination of – the multiaxial system, as well as the changes to the criteria, symptoms, and diagnosis of PTSD.

A subsequent post will deal specifically with the criteria for PTSD and will include suggestions for cross-examination of plaintiff’s diagnosing mental health professional.

Changes to the Multiaxial System in DSM-5

Despite its widespread use, particularly among some insurance agencies and the government, the multiaxial system in DSM-IV was not required to make a mental disorder diagnosis.  DSM-5 has moved to a nonaxial diagnostic model (formerly AXES I, II, and III), with separate notations for important psychosocial and contextual factors (formerly Axis IV) and disability (formerly Axis V).  The approach of distinguishing diagnosis from psychosocial and contextual factors is also consistent with established WHO and ICD guidelines, which consider the individual’s functional status separately from his or her diagnosis or symptom status.

DSM-IV Axis V consisted of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale, representing the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of “functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.”  It was recommended that the GAF be dropped from DSM-5 for a number of reasons, including its conceptual lack of clarity (e.g., including symptoms, suicide risk, and disabilities in the descriptors) and questionable psychometrics in routine practice.  In order to provide a global measure of disability, the WHO Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS) is included in DSM-5 for further study.

Changes to PTSD in DSM-5

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) is a Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder.  DSM-5 criteria for PTSD differ significantly from the DSM-IV.  The stressor criterion (Criterion A) is more explicit with regard to events that qualify as “traumatic” experiences.  Also, DSM-IV Criterion A2 (subjective reaction) has been eliminated.

Whereas there were three major symptom clusters in DSM-IV – re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and arousal – there are now four symptom clusters in DSM-5 because the avoidance/numbing cluster is divided into two distinct clusters: avoidance and persistent negative alterations in cognitions and mood.  The latter category, which retains most of the DSM-IV numbing symptoms, also includes new or re-conceptualized symptoms such as persistent negative emotional states.  The final cluster – alterations in arousal and reactivity – retains most of the DSM-IV arousal symptoms.  It also includes angry outbursts and reckless or self-destructive behavior.

PTSD is now developmentally sensitive in that diagnostic thresholds have been lowered for children and adolescents.  Furthermore, separate criteria have been added for children age 6 years or younger with this disorder.

The DSM-IV childhood diagnosis of reactive attachment disorder had two subtypes: emotionally withdrawn/inhibited and indiscriminately social/disinhibited.  In DSM-5, these subtypes are defined as distinct disorders: “reactive attachment disorder” and “disinhibited social engagement disorder.”

Olson Brooksby is a product liability, personal injury, and aviation defense firm.

Casualty, Manufacturing, Oregon Law, Premises Liability, Product Liability

Oregon Law Requires Places of Public Assembly (Including Large Brick and Mortar Retailers) To Have At Least One Automated External Defibrilator

Premises owners should be aware that at least one automated external defibrillator (“AED”) may be required in their buildings.  On January 1, 2010, Senate Bill (S.B.) 556, codified as ORS 431.690, took effect, requiring certain building owners to place at least one automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on their “premises.”  The requirement applies to “places of public assembly” which are defined as “facilities” that have at least “50,000 square feet” of “floor space” and where: (1) the “public congregates for purposes such as deliberation, shopping, entertainment, amusement or awaiting transportation;” or “business activities are conducted;” and (2) at least 25 people “congregate” there on a “normal business day.”  S.B. 556 (1)(a)-(b).

In 2011, S.B. 1033 amended ORS 431.690 to require the placement of at least one AED in public and private schools and health clubs as well.

In other words, businesses and facilities with over 50,000 square feet of floor space must have a defibrillator on their premises if at least 25 people “congregate” there on a normal day.  A copy of the statute requiring AEDs is found at http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/431.690

It is safe to assume that most product manufacturing facilities comprise 50,000 or more square feet.  However, despite the fact that this law has been in effect for more than three years, many Oregon businesses affected by the law are not compliant.

Discussion

The AED law does not provide a definition for the word “congregate,” nor does it specify whether 25 people must be present at one time or can come and go over the course of an entire business day.  When Oregon courts interpret ambiguous language, they focus primarily on the text and context of the statute and secondarily on legislative history.  State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 172, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009).  When analyzing the text of a statute, it is useful to consider the dictionary definition of any ambiguous words.  The dictionary definition of “congregate” is “to come together; to assemble; to meet,” or “to collect into a group, crowd, or assembly.”   Black’s Law Dictionary 301 (6th ed., West 1990), Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 243 (10th ed., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1997)

Given the dictionary definitions, one could reasonably argue that the new law applies only to businesses that have at least 25 people present at some point during the day (i.e. “assembled” or “together” at one time).  However, the legislative history of the bill may suggest a different interpretation.  S.B. 556 originally had no 25-person requirement, and therefore would have applied to all businesses with floor space exceeding 50,000 square feet.  This specification requiring at least 25 people to congregate was added by way of an amendment suggested during a work session of the Health Care and Veterans’ Affairs Committee (held on April 4, 2009).  At that meeting, Senator Wayne Morse expressed concern that the bill would require industrial warehouses with very few employees to install AEDs.  One of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Jeff Kruse, agreed and said that they intended the bill to apply to “big department stores,” shopping centers, “office buildings” and the like, but not sparsely populated warehouses.  Relying on this legislative history, it is more likely that the 25 person requirement was not intended to exempt stores that have more than 25 visitors during a day even if they are not all present at the same time.

For a business such as a large brick and mortar retailer, there are two threshold questions that determine whether ORS 431.690 (S.B. 556 applies).  First, does the store or other business have over 50,000 square feet of floor space?  And, second, do at least 25 people congregate at the business on a typical business day?  If the answer to both questions is yes, the business is subject to the AED requirement.  If a minimum of 25 people did not congregate during a typical business day, then there is a good argument that the business would be exempt from the law.

Note that the statute places no limitations on the reason the 25 people have congregated in one place.  The statute provides a nonexclusive list of some of the reasons people have for gathering in these places – “deliberation, shopping, entertainment, amusement or awaiting transportation.”  In the context of a “big box” retailer, for example, the 25 people would likely consist of any person present in the store including, but not limited to, all employees, shoppers, repair or maintenance contractors, or anyone else visiting the store.

Although this insight into the legislative history may be interesting, businesses should not get lost in debating the letter of the statute or meaning of what “congregate” signifies.  If the business believes it might in any way meet the parameters of the statutory requirements, they should simply install an AED.

The law does not specify where the AED should be located or contain any provisions regarding access.  The law merely specifies that the AED shall be “on the premises.”  Based on the absence of any specification, it does not appear that the AED necessarily need be available to any member of the public in the establishment at the time the AED is needed.

Part of S.B. 556 (now codified at ORS 30.802) Provides Protection From Liability For Those Who Comply With The AED Requirement

A provision of S.B. 556, now codified at ORS 30.802, provides a fairly broad immunity provision for those locations which comply with the statutory requirement and maintain an AED on premises, so long as the business is in compliance with the particulars of the immunity provision such as making sure there are employees trained in the use of the AED.  A copy of the statute providing liability protection is found at  http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/30.802

The cost of AEDs has dropped precipitously with increased competition and more efficient mass production.  The benefits of compliance with the Oregon statute, including immunity from suit, vastly outweigh the risks of non-compliance.  Moreover, there is conclusive evidence that AEDs save lives.  If you have questions, please contact our office.

Olson Brooksby often represents national retailers with large brick and mortar locations.

Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Uncategorized

Punitive Damages

Initially Pleading the Claim for Punitive Damages is Not Permitted in Original Complaint

Punitive damages are permitted in Oregon in product liability actions. Under Oregon law, at the time of filing a pleading with the court, the pleading may not contain a request for an award of punitive damages. ORS 31.725. At any time after the pleading is filed, a party may move the court to allow the party to amend the pleading to assert a claim for punitive damages. The party making the motion may submit affidavits and documents in support of the claim and the party opposing may do the same. Punitive damages in Oregon are an element of damages, and do not constitute a separate claim for relief. Under Oregon law, insurance coverage for punitive damages is permitted.

The Standard for Pleading Punitive Damages

Oregon has a relatively low bar for the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs need only present “some evidence” of the conduct that may give rise to punitive damages. ORS 31.725(3)(a). The showing necessary for the amendment is equivalent to a prima facie case that would merely need to withstand a motion for directed verdict at the time the amendment is sought. We emphasize that this showing of “some evidence” is a low bar, particularly in Multnomah County Circuit Court. In most cases, when plaintiffs intend add a claim for punitive damages, they will expressly state in the initial complaint an intent to move to amend to do so.

In most counties in Oregon, punitive damages are generally not allowed in simple negligence cases. However, in Multnomah County Circuit Court, we have seen simple negligence cases where judges have allowed punitive damages to go to the jury.

The Clear and Convincing Standard and Evidence of Conduct Required at Trial

In order to actually obtain an award of punitive damages from the jury, as opposed to merely obtaining permission from the judge to request punitive damages in an amended complaint, Oregon law requires imposition of a clear and convincing standard. Punitive damages are not available unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages are sought has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others. ORS 31.730.

If a jury awards punitive damages, the court is required to review the award to determine whether the award is within the range of damages that a rational juror would be entitled to award based on the record as a whole, as well as statutory and common law factors. ORS 31.725 et. seq.

Statutory Allocation of Awards of Punitive Damages

With respect to the distribution of punitive damages, the percentages of the total award are all prescribed by statute. ORS 31.735. Under the statute, the State of Oregon takes 60% of every punitive damage award away from the plaintiff and puts it in the state crime victim’s fund. Then, plaintiff receives 30% and the attorney is paid an amount out of this 30%, but in no event more than 20% of the total punitive damages awarded. Finally, 10% is payable to the Oregon Attorney General for deposit in the State Court Facilities and Security Account. Plaintiff’s lawyers know this, so they often try to push harder to get the jury to award noneconomic damages. They may even decide to forego a punitive damages claim to avoid the risk of having a lower noneconomic damages award and a high punitive damages award that will go mostly to the state of Oregon. In cases with exposure to significant punitive damages, the Oregon Justice Department will often file a peremptory lien against the punitive damages to ensure proper distribution.

Damages Caps

There are no relevant damages caps on personal injury actions, as opposed to wrongful death actions. While Oregon case law has upheld a cap of $500,000 in noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has declined to impose such a cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases on the basis that a personal injury cause of action was recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the Oregon Constitution. In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the statutory cap on noneconomic damages because the wrongful death action is a creature of statute, and a cause of action that did not exist at the time of the ratification of the Oregon Constitution.

One important note about the noneconomic damages cap of $500,000: While the cap has now been upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in an en banc decision, this does not prevent the plaintiffs from pleading any amount they want to in the complaint. Under the statute, the jury is never told of the cap, and if the verdict for noneconomic damages exceeds the cap, it is the judge, not the jury, who reduces the verdict to $500,000 before entering the judgment. The judgment, rather than the verdict, is technically the document that has legal force. The entry of the judgment either starts the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal, or allows the plaintiff to execute on the judgment (collect either through voluntary payment or seizure of assets).

For example, let’s consider a hypothetical aviation crash. Suppose wife/mother is injured and her husband and son are killed. She could theoretically file a lawsuit demanding $50,000,000.00 in noneconomic damages for both her deceased son and husband. If the case went to trial under that scenario, and that amount was awarded, the judge, unbeknownst to the jury, and after the jury is excused from service, would reduce the verdicts in the two wrongful death cases to $500,000 each in noneconomic damages before entering the judgment.

Consumer products, Defective Products, Discovery, Evidence, Litigation, Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Prior Claims, Product Liability, Trials

Discovery and Admissiblity of Evidence of Prior Claims in Oregon Product Liability Cases

Olson Brooksby handles a wide variety of product liability cases involving products such as helicopter engines, heavy equipment, steel, toys, tools, household appliances and chemicals, paints, and solvents.  We frequently work with clients who have had prior claims involving allegedly defective products.  In product liability litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers almost always ask for documentation involving prior claims.  Usually, plaintiffs issue a broad request for documents regarding all prior incidents of any kind related to the model of product at issue or any version of that model.

The Standard for Discovery of Prior Claims

In Oregon, evidence regarding prior claims is generally discoverable.  ORCP 36 B(1).  In order for an opposing or other party to obtain discovery, the evidence should simply be relevant and reasonably likely to lead the discovery of admissible evidence.  Therefore, on a motion to compel, product liability defense counsel should expect that documentation concerning prior claims will be discoverable, particularly in cases concerning home appliances and other mechanical products.

An objection to a discovery request on the basis that the evidence may not be admissible at trial is not proper.  Oregon trial courts will allow discovery of evidence of prior claims if the products, conditions, or uses are merely “similar” as opposed to “identical.”

By way of a hypothetical example, suppose Large Bike Manufacturing Company manufactured a number of bikes during the past few months or years and the front rim of the tire was bending when bumps were hit that similar bikes were able to withstand.  Also suppose that a bicyclist was injured when the front rim on one of the bike models struck a speed bump even though the bicyclist was riding cautiously and reasonably.  On a motion to compel, most Oregon state court trial judges would order the production of all prior incidents of injury regarding other bike models with the same wheel, not just the model of bike that the bicyclist was riding.  The court would also likely order production of other claims of injury on all bikes, even if such injuries were caused by other mechanical failures.

The Standard for Admissibility of Prior Claims

The admissibility of evidence of other claims is governed by Oregon Evidence Code (“OEC”) 401, which defines relevant evidence; OEC 402, which provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible; and OEC 403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence in the event prejudice, confusion, or undue delay associated with the admission of the disputed evidence, in this case of prior claims, outweighs the probative value or helpfulness to the trier of fact.  Whether evidence of prior claims is discoverable and whether such evidence is admissible are two distinct issues.

With respect to the admissibility of evidence of prior claims, as opposed to the mere discovery of prior claims, OEC 401 generally provides that evidence of similar prior conduct, events, accidents, or even negligence, is generally held to be inadmissible to prove negligence or lack of negligence in the case being litigated.

However, evidence of prior similar acts, conduct, or events, which Oregon courts universally have ruled includes prior claims, is often held admissible to prove causation, danger, knowledge, intent, or the existence of a particular defect.  One of the seminal cases on this issue is Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 185 Or App 444 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 479 (2003).  Admissibility of the allegedly similar act will depend on whether prior conduct or events occurred under “similar conditions and circumstances,” although identical circumstances are not required.  Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 144 Or App 52, (1996), aff’d, 325 Or 438 (1997).

Whether the conditions and circumstances are substantially similar enough to allow admission of the evidence of prior claims is a decision for the court and will be reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard, which is a high standard.  As noted above, identical circumstances or an identical product is not necessary for admission of such evidence. Generally, unless there is clear prejudice, evidence of prior claims will be admissible.  The judge will usually comment that defense counsel is free to engage in cross-examination on the differences in the claims and argue that they go to the weight of the evidence.

In a product liability case, regardless of what the product may be, defense counsel should be prepared for a ruling that evidence of prior claims is discoverable.  Counsel should also be prepared for a ruling that evidence of prior claims is admissible.  Therefore, it may be advantageous to file a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior claims on the grounds that they are either dissimilar, or that there is insufficient information to even determine whether they are dissimilar.  The motion in limine should be filed before trial, so that even if the court admits evidence of prior claims, experts and witnesses can be prepared to address the prior claims in a way that minimizes any perceived wrongdoing.  Counsel should also consider the possibility that any product design changes may be considered “subsequent remedial measures” and should plan any motions in limine accordingly.

 

Aviation, Burn injuries, Catastrophic Injury, Litigation, Manufacturing, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Workplace Injuries

Managing burn risks in the manufuacturing industry

Scott_0844

Lawyers for the manufacturing industry should pay particular attention to assisting their clients with managing burn risks.  One of the under-recognized aspects of workplace injury risk has to do with the relationship between the level of technology and the potential for risk.  The following is from Scott Brooksby’s article published in a manufacturing trade online magazine,  Manufacturing.net, which delivers to a global community the most up-to-date news, trends and opinions shaping the manufacturing landscape–

The Manufacturing Industry Should Assess Its Technology Ladders When Addressing Burn Risk

There are few more sophisticated and complex high-heat metallurgy manufacturing industry processes — and few with less tolerance for error — than the processes involved in manufacturing components of the hot-section of an aviation gas turbine engine. This precision minimizes the risk of catastrophic aviation disasters such as uncontrolled engine failure.

Involving super-heated, liquefied metals and extremely hot smelters, furnaces, crucibles or molds, it might be assumed that hot-section manufacturing constitutes a high-risk burn environment.  Actually, the danger of serious burns in any manufacturing environment often are misunderstood or underappreciated — as are the staggering human and economic costs. With a single bad burn, a worker can be scarred for life, and manufacturers or insurers may be exposed to tens of millions of dollars in worker’s compensation payments, settlements or verdicts. And no class of burns creates greater tragedy or higher financial costs than 4thdegree, full-thickness burns to the hands and face associated with super-hot metal production.

Just to illustrate, burn-center treatment of a 4th degree burn covering 20 percent of a victim’s body — a “serious large burn” — easily can exceed $750,000 for the first few months of intensive treatment at a burn center. Reconstructive surgery can continue for decades, and pain and the humiliation of disfigurement can be a life-long burden for the victim.

Precision not the only benefit of sophisticated automation

But burns in aviation hot-section parts production are relatively rare for three basic reasons. First, and principally, automated technology that delivers micron-level tolerances minimizes human error — systems that utilize computerized ovens and robots so complex that molten metals are measured to the microgram are unlikely locations for human error that leads to a burn injury.

Second, largely due to the complexity of the process and technology, the hot-section manufacturing workforce frequently is uncommonly long-tenured, highly skilled and well-educated. Last, workers are subject to disciplined safety training, and benefit from high-tech personal protective equipment — principally to reduce the risk of burns. Phenomenal technology, great training and a superior workforce all combine to mitigate the hazards of super-heated metals production.

With turbine fan blade manufacturing as a case in point, let’s review the correlation between technology sophistication, training and burn risk.

Moving down the technology ladder moves you up the burn-risk ladder

At the height of technology and its attendant safety halo are compressor, turbine disc and turbine blade manufacturing stages, with computer-controlled processes delivering incredible product quality while keeping workers safe from burns.

Highly trained technical workers oversee the automated process of powder metallurgy, in which titanium is heated to its melting point of 3,000°F and spun onto a rapidly rotating turntable, transforming the molten metal into microscopic droplets that quickly cool and form a fine metal powder. In enclosed ovens, the powder is reheated to more than 1,000°F, and pressed at 25,000 psi into a disc. All of this takes place in a sealed environment.

Turbine discs and blades, also formed through powder metallurgy, are subject to even greater stresses because of the intense heat of the nearby engine combustors.

Here we begin stepping down the technology ladder and up the risk ladder, as molten metal often is hand-poured into molds. First, copies of the blades are formed by pouring wax into metal molds. Once set, the wax shape is removed and immersed in a super-heated ceramic slurry bath, forming a ceramic coating. Each cluster of shapes is heated to harden the ceramic and melt the wax, and molten metal is poured into the hollow left by the melted wax.

Depending on the material being formed, turbine blades are subject to temperatures of from 1,000 to 2,500°F, so they are coated in ceramic thermal barrier coatings. The ceramic must be melted, and the blades dipped by workers into the molten ceramic, again at temperatures far exceeding 1,000°F.

While major portions of the fan blade stages take place in compartments, production of parts such as combustion chambers and compressor blades revert back to traditional casting methods, with workers directly exposed to liquefied titanium and metal alloys being poured into molds, which often are manually handled.

Burn risk skyrockets in secondary processes

It’s axiomatic to say that burn risk escalates as a production line transitions from fully automated to a blend of automated and manual processes, to strictly manual processes. Less well-recognized is the reality that for virtually all metals manufacturers, the least automated, dirtiest and most dangerous aspects of production are secondary processes — such as mold cleaning in aviation engine hot-section manufacturing. Unfortunately, the combination of “first assignment” areas for new, contract or temporary workers and lack of automation can lead to tragic result.

In hot-section cleaning departments, parts are dipped in large, open tanks of high-temperature caustic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide and potassium hydroxide to remove most of the casting shell.  The chemicals themselves pose a potential danger, and the threat of burns escalates due to combination of heat and the mechanical nature of the work — which industry to date hasn’t yet found a way to automate.

Further, in this setting, workers periodically climb into empty tanks to undertake a potentially perilous task known as “tank digging.” It’s been documented that in some cases, workers with less than 90 days on the job have been assigned a supervisory role in this processes.

A caution regarding temporary workers where burns may occur

Although as noted, aviation component manufacturing generally employs a highly skilled workforce, but even here, the intersection of low technology and temporary or less skilled workers is a dangerous one. First, new or inexperienced workers frequently aren’t fully aware of risks and dangers involved in a job, and secondly, because of legal and financial ramifications in the event of a burn injury to a contract worker.

This is especially critical since, in most states, worker’s compensation is the worker’s sole remedy against the employer. Worker’s compensation does not typically provide for non-economic damages (pain and suffering), which dramatically spike the value of litigated settlements or verdicts in burn cases. However, other classes of workers — notably temporary and other contract workers — may be able to sue for non-economic damages resulting in verdicts or settlements that can cripple a company.

Therefore, burned workers will look for employer targets who do not ensure protections typically afforded through worker’s compensation or indemnity across all classes of workers.

Decrease risk to the business as well as to workers

In addition to investing deeply in training and the safest manufacturing equipment, every manufacturer first needs to be aware of legal and financial ramifications in the event of a burn injury to a contract worker. Employers should exercise caution in the placement of temporary workers, and closely review contracts with temporary worker service providers to ensure that iron-clad provisions are in place to contractually obligate service providers to provide worker’s compensation for the temporary employee. Also, manufacturers also should insist on indemnity provisions that protect against any claims brought by the temporary worker for injury.

In many areas, the aviation hot section component manufacturing industry represents a pinnacle of safety training and manufacturing technology.  But a lesson can be learned in recognizing the increased threat of burn risk at stages where the technology footprint is light, and the workers are less trained and less invested.

 

Burn injuries, Catastrophic Injury, Damages, Litigation, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Workplace Injuries

Aftercare considerations in catastrophic injury cases, particularly burn injury cases

Catastrophic injury cases can be particularly difficult to defend.  Burn injury cases are difficult to defend due to the severe, painful, and grotesque nature of the injury.  With relatively few exceptions, there is no such thing as a short stay in a regional burn center.  Such centers do not treat sunburns or minor cooking accidents.  Based on our experience when defending serious burn cases, it is not uncommon for stays in burn centers to last weeks, months, or even in excess of a year.  Stays of many months or exceeding a year typically cost well into the seven figures for past treatment.  Such aftercare means that most burn cases are high-exposure cases that require serious evaluation and preparation.

Treatment After Discharge From the Burn Center

Serious burns are not “healed” at the point of discharge from the burn center.  Release from the burn center in serious burn cases typically signals the beginning of a long series of follow up treatment visits and possibly scar revisions, as well as additional grafting or other procedures.  Aftercare treatment may last months, years, or even decades in the most severe cases.  Discharge typically begins with admission to a step-down facility.  This is typically a residential facility affiliated with, and in close proximity to, the burn center.  The length of stay in the step-down facility varies, but usually lasts about thirty days.

Both at the step-down facility and after return to home care, the victim of a serious burn will begin a series of follow up visits with the burn physician.  The most common aftercare is a continuation of excision and grafting, both to those areas where grafts have been rejected or did not “take” sufficiently, or where multiple grafts are required for a structural or functional purpose.  Depending on the nature of the necessary revision procedures and the skill required, this can be a complicating factor when the burn victim lives far from a regional burn center.  Extensive travel time may be required and often the plaintiff will seek monetary damages for such travel, or argue that, by definition, it constitutes an impairment of earning capacity due to employment interruption.

Another common aftercare procedure is tissue expansion.  With tissue expansion, a balloon expander is inserted under the skin in the area in need of repair.  Over time, the balloon will gradually be filled with saline solution, slowly causing the skin to stretch and grow.  Once enough extra skin has been grown, it is then used to correct or reconstruct a damaged body part.  This is common for breast reconstruction and parts of the upper torso.

Typically burn surgeons and plastic surgeons will take an inventory approach to necessary reconstructive and plastic procedures.  They will triage the most problematic areas, starting with the face, head and extremities, if affected, and work through a graded inventory of affected areas.  This could go on for five-plus years.  With many patients, the psychological aspect of treatment becomes the most difficult.  It feels as though they are constantly having surgeries, even if the surgeries are, in fact, intermittent.

In burn cases, the major and minor reconstructive surgeries will eventually reach the point where scar repair has no functional relevance and is cosmetic only.  However, this is more complicated with major burns because total body or near total body burns are tied to functional needs, and this makes the query about whether a given procedure will produce worthwhile, if any, additional cosmetic benefits more difficult.  The total body surface area that is burned, particularly if it includes the face and hands, may drive some conflict in the debate regarding whether further procedures add function or are merely cosmetic and whether further cosmetic benefit can even be achieved.

Because Burn Cases Are Generally High-Exposure Cases, it is Important to Hire the Best Experts and Consider All Variables When Assessing Damages.

Some burn injuries, such as deeply burned hands, cannot ever be fully restored.  Furthermore, some burn reconstructive surgeries go on for many years, even as many as thirty-plus years.  It is imperative in the defense of burn cases to hire the best possible expert.  Because a significant portion of the potential exposure lies in the intensive nature and long arc of the aftercare, the expert can be helpful in preparation for cross-examination of the plaintiff’s expert on whether some of the allegedly needed procedures will provide any functional, or even any significant cosmetic, benefit that would justify both the cost and the risks that are perennially associated with grafting, such as rejection, infection and additional scarring.

When a reasonable settlement is possible, it should be seriously considered, even when there appear to be good defenses.  Those defenses can be useful negotiation points during a settlement.  Variables in burn centers, surgical treatment, aftercare, the nature of the burn, and the presentation of the plaintiff all make any hard and fast rules for case assessment ineffective.  But manufacturers and insurers should keep in mind that burns, unlike most other injuries, especially to children, have the potential to create unpredictable, and possibly soaring verdicts.