Category Archives: aviation lawyer

To curb medical helicopter crashes, focus on pilot haste, experience

Modern healthcare capture
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services crashes

Here’s an opinion piece by shareholder Scott Brooksby,  published in the June 10 issue of Modern Healthcare:

To curb medical helicopter crashes, focus on pilot haste, experience

A dramatic national conversation erupted recently following a U.S. National Transportation Safety Board finding that smart phone texting was a contributing factor in the crash of a fatal medical-helicopter flight in 2011.

The discussion has concentrated on everything from connecting the event to the dangers of texting while driving to calls for a ban on texting by pilots in air medical operations.

Absent from the discussion, however, is a larger issue that’s well recognized by helicopter industry safety organizations, and what should be of great concern for hospital administration and other organizations that contract emergency helicopter services.  The issue has to do with the egregiously high incidence of fatal and critical Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) crashes, and resulting personal injuries.

In comparison to virtually every other type of commercial aviation, there is an inordinate rate of accidents within medical helicopter aviation, with the 2010 NTSB data proof in point.

Essentially, NTSB segregates aviation operations into hundreds of categories, the largest being all U.S. major domestic air carrier flights.  In 2010, NTSB reported only 14 accidents among major air carrier aviation, none of which were fatal.  By contrast, in 2010 there were 13 HEMS accidents, including seven fatal crashes.

Medical helicopter pilots are heroic and driven individuals who are among the best-trained and highest-skilled pilots in the world and fly what arguably are the most dangerous missions outside of military aviation.  HEMS pilots possess the grit and courage to go forth in dangerous conditions any time of night or day, in icy conditions or great heat, in storms, in densely trafficked urban controlled airspace, and remote uncontrolled airspace.

The most dangerous occupation

Operating without the benefit of formal flight plans with takeoffs and landings in uncontrolled locations ranging from roads to ball fields to the tops of buildings, the challenge is incredible.  Speed is critical.  But it comes with great risk.  In fact, according to a University of Chicago report, crewing a medical helicopter is the most dangerous profession in America.

Clearly it takes a special individual to accept the challenge.  But according to the International Helicopter Safety Team, the same attributes of risk tolerance, confidence and dogged determinism required of a HEMS pilot commonly are the very factors that, when excessive, lead to helicopter pilot error.

But what complicates the issue of haste to meet critical needs is the fact that the majority of HEMS accidents occur not when pilots are ferrying a patient to emergency treatment, but instead take place when pilots are rushing to the scene to pick up a patient, or the transportation of organs.

NTSB data shows that fully 58 percent of the 31 medical flight accidents occurring from 2007 to 2009 took place when the HEMS aircraft were en route to pick up an injured patient, or involved organ transport organs. Only 42 percent of HEMS accidents occurred with patients on board.

Haste and pilot error under harrowing conditions is exacerbated in the case of less experienced HEMS pilots.  Although on the whole HEMS pilots rank among the most experienced and capable pilots in the world, NTSB records indicate that flight hours of HEMS pilots not involved in accidents have logged 19 times as much air time in a particular aircraft as those involved in accidents.

Managing contract helicopter risk

Since 2005, there has been an increasing call for greater safety requirements in HEMS aviation, focusing largely on navigation equipment and flight dispatch and monitoring systems.  We expect to see continued progress in that area.

In the meantime, to reduce the incidence of HEMS crashes as well as to exercise prudent risk management, here are some steps for hospital administrators to consider:

–        Review your HEMS contractor pilot training program, with a preference for programs that not only meet, but exceed, FAA compliance levels;

–        Request documentation of contractor aviation risk assessment programs, and review the specific crew checklist parameters to assess risk level of each flight;

–        Stipulate that pilots have a minimal level of flying hours on the specific type of aircraft to be used in life flight operations;

–        Stipulate that pilots have a certain level of military flying service, or equivalent civilian training;

–        Review pilot histories and encourage condition-specific training that corresponds to local conditions; and

–        To limit claims against your hospital or organization, ensure that your HEMS contracts contain solid indemnity provisions.

Although the tragic human consequences of a fatal medical helicopter crash are clear, there’s less recognition of the massive risk of litigation, which while principally focused on the flight service company easily can become a deep, years-long issue for the contracting hospital organization.

HEMS operators are the first line of defense in one of the greatest challenges of emergency care, operating under diligent training execution and best principles of safe flight as established by the FAA and contractor safety policies.  However, perfection is an aspiration, and recognizing the record of accidents, hospital organizations should look beyond smart phone bans to limit the occurrence and risk of medical helicopter accidents.

 

 

NTSB Releases Statistics on Aviation Fatalities in 2011

The National Transportation Safety Board is a unique federal agency.  It is not a federal executive branch agency.  Rather, it is congressionally chartered with a single aviation mandate: to investigate every aviation accident in the Unites States, determine the probable cause of the accident, and make recommendations to help protect against future accidents.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1132, 1135 (Lexis Nexis 2006 and Supp. 2011).  Although the full extent of the operational and investigative methods of the NTSB are beyond the scope of this article, 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) prohibits litigants from using the final probable cause report prepared by the Board in any manner.  However, the NTSB has a team of investigators in different specialty areas who prepare factual reports that do not involve conclusions regarding the cause of the crash.  Use of these reports depends on the particular judge’s rulings on the rules of evidence, particularly Rule 803(8).

The NTSB recently released aviation data and statistics for transportation fatalities in 2011, including aviation.  According to the NTSB, there were 494 aviation fatalities in 2011.  Those fatalities are broken down by area as follows:  General Aviation (444); Air Taxi (41); Foreign/Unregistered (9); Airlines (0); and Commuter (0).

Olson Brooksby PC maintains an active aviation accident and aviation component part product liability defense practice.  For further information, please contact our office.

NTSB Hearing on Medical Helicopter Crash Considers Pilot Texting Ban

Close up of judge raising gavel in courtroom

The NTSB held a hearing on a fatal medical helicopter crash that took place in 2011.  After finding that smart phone texting was a contributing factor in the fatal crash, the NTSB recently considered a ban on pilot texting.  It is surprising that such a regulation is not already in place or under more serious consideration.  Because there was evidence that the pilot had not been texting during the 19 minutes before the crash, however, the NTSB did not take any formal action on such a ban.

This is part of a larger issue that demands attention — the egregiously high incidence of fatal and critical Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) crashes, and resulting personal injuries.

Olson Brooksby practices a wide variety of aviation law.  We have experience representing airlines, aviation insurers, aviation product manufacturers, and airplane owners.  Our attorneys have handled a broad variety of aviation law matters, including personal injury defense; product liability defense litigation; contract and lease drafting; contract negotiation and disputes; and general aviation commercial litigation.

Much of the firm’s practice is devoted to aviation law, and we are one of the few firms in Oregon with aviation trial experience.  Scott Brooksby leads our aviation practice, devoting a substantial amount of his time and practice to aviation-related matters.  Scott served as local counsel for one of the largest aviation manufacturers in the world in a nine-week trial in Oregon state court.  The trial involved product liability issues and concerned a helicopter crash that resulted in burns, permanent injuries, and multiple deaths.  Mr. Brooksby is on the aviation subcommittee of the American Bar Association’s Mass Torts section.  Mr. Brooksby has also been featured as a speaker and a moderator at the American Bar Association’s Aviation Litigation National Institute in New York, New York.

Helicopter Crashes in Helicopter Air Medical Operations

People are surprised to learn that helicopter crashes are more prevalent in Helicopter Air Medical Operations.  Generally, the statistical number of incidents of injury, accident or death in 14 C.F.R.§ 121 (known as “Part 121”, or commercial passenger aviation) operations are incredibly low.  There are more serious injuries and deaths resulting from helicopter air medical operations.

For example, in 2010, according to the NTSB (which is charged with investigating every aviation accident in the United States, and many abroad), there were no fatalities in any of the Part 121 accidents in 2010.  This despite some 17.5 million Part 121 flight hours.  Of all of the Part 121 flight hours in 2010, the most common defining event was a turbulence encounter, accounting for 26% of all Part 121 accidents in 2010.

Most of the defining events for Part 121 accidents in 2010 (just as they have been in general for the last 10 years) were events such as ground collisions, ground handling, runway incursion, cabin safety, system failure, bird strikes etc., many or most of which are ground events.  More than half of the Part 121 accidents that occurred in 2010 occurred during takeoff or landing (according to NTSB data, this is generally true of Part 121 accidents every year).  Less than half of Part 121 accidents in 2010 happened en route.  However, the major factor in Part 121 accidents is turbulence (even though, as a cumulative total, there are more incidents during takeoff and landing than there are en route).  En route, turbulence is the biggest factor in accidents because commercial airlines fly at multiples of the altitude that, for example, helicopters do.

Given the relative flying altitudes, flight durations, weather events, cruise speeds etc., involved in Part 121 operations, turbulence, as it is understood in Part 121 accidents, does not have anything to do with the relatively high incidents involved in helicopter air medical operations or helicopter accidents in general.

Interestingly, according to NTSB data, most helicopter air medical operations involving fatalities do not occur when patients are being transported.  Rather, most occur when helicopters are en route to get patients or when they are transporting organs.  The inference to be drawn is that, while helicopters have great pilots, those pilots are taking chances while flying that they do not take when a patient is on board.

Air medical operations are conducted under both Part 135 and Part 91, depending on whether patients are being carried on board the aircraft.  Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (“HEMS”) missions en route to collect patients, or organs, or to reposition aircraft after accomplishing patient transport operations, are generally conducted under Part 91.  Trips conducted to transport patients or organs on board are conducted under Part 135.  Some air medical helicopter operations, particularly for emergency medical services are conducted by state or local government entities as public use flights, whether patients are on board or not.

Although fixed-wing aircraft are also used for Part 91 and Part 135 medical missions, there were only 10 fixed wing fatalities in air medical operations during the entire decade between 2000 and 2009.

A Statistical Overview of HEMS Accident Frequency and Type

HEMS accounted for about 80 percent of all air medical accidents during the ten-year period 2001-2010.  Against this backdrop, we examine HEMS accidents, where in 2010 alone, there were 13 Helicopter Emergency Medicine Accidents (“HEMS”), 7 of which were fatal.  http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/ARA1201.pdf (at page 2)  Six of the Seven HEMS fatalities in 2010 involved operations under Part 91.  From 200 through 2010 (the most recent year NTSB statistics are available), 33 percent of HEMS accidents were fatal.  Most HEMS accidents occurred during airborne phases of flight and during 2010, all HEMS fatalities occurred during airborne phases of flight.

Obviously this is explained in part by the fact that unlike fixed-wing air medical operations, HEMS do not generally operate out of establish aerodromes.  Instead, they operate out of off-airport locations where patients are in need of timely, critical care.  In every year except 2007, the number of Part 91 air medical helicopter accidents without patients aboard have been significantly higher than any other category of air medical flying.  http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/ARA1101.pdf (at page 23)

It may be useful to breakdown the 31 accidents involving 32 helicopters in air medical operations between 2007-2009.  Eighteen were being operated under Part 91, 13 were conducted under Part 135, and one was conducted as a public use flight.  Eleven of the accidents, involving 12 helicopters, were fatal.  Collision with objects on takeoff or landing accounted for 7 of the 31 accidents, but no fatalities.  On the other hand, four of the five controlled flight into terrain accidents were fatal, including the crash of the Maryland State Police Public use flight carrying accident victims on approach to Andrews Air Force Base.  Two of the three loss of control in-flight accidents were fatal, as were two of the three unintended flights into instrument meteorological conditions accidents.  The midair collision between two HEMS helicopters conducting Part 135 operations in Flagstaff, Arizona, in June 2008 was also fatal to all on board.  The other two fatalities involving a non-power plant system were coded as other.  http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/ARA1101.pdf (at page 24)

What Are The Typical Causes?

In any aviation operation, pilot training and experience, and pilot judgment are some of the most important factors in safe flight.  With helicopter operations generally, and particularly HEMS operations, pilot experience, training and judgment are even more critical because of the conditions they fly in, such as bad weather, night, rural areas where wires or other low strike points may not be lighted or marked and air-traffic may be uncontrolled.  HEMS operations also face an unparalleled need for speed to save lives.  Review of individual NTSB probably cause reports, NTSB factual data and other aviation industry data would tend to suggest that fatal and serious injury helicopter accidents are most often the result of a number of factors including loss of control, visibility issues, wired strikes, system component failure or post-impact fire.  Although some of these issues pose dangers during Part 121 operations, they simply do not pose the same risks, largely due to obvious differences in the nature of the aviation operation, the equipment, altitude, avionics, take-off and landings from tightly controlled air-space and the use of aerodromes.  In addition, HEMS operations often involve situations in which minutes may literally save life and limb, prompting hurried behavior.  While that is not to suggest that HEMS pilots are not some of the best helicopter pilots flying, they do face particular challenges, to which Part 121 pilots or even fixed-wing air medical operations pilots are less exposed.

There are also tremendous swings in helicopter air medical pilot training.  From 2007-2009, for example, NTSB data suggest that the accident helicopter pilots’ median age was 54, ranging from 35 to 69.  Median total flight hours were 7,125 with a range from 2,685 to 18,000.  The median time in the type of accident helicopter was 375 hours, ranging from 11 to 4,241.  Statistics suggest that such variations in flight time and the corollary impact on experience and judgment may be significant factors in the number of crashes. http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/ARA1101.pdf (at page 26).  HEMS operations more often than not must use unimproved landing sites at accident scenes and helipads and hospitals or medical facilities.  Loss of control in flight was the most common event for both fatal and non-fatal helicopter crashes, followed by collisions on takeoff or landing and system component failure of the power plant.

Even though HEMS pilots may have thousands of flight hours, and are unquestionably some of the best helicopter pilots in the world, owners and operators of HEMS operations should continuously emphasize the consistent causes of HEMS crashes and adapt training programs to focus on those causes.

Olson Brooksby has an active aviation accident and aviation component product liability defense practice.  For more information, please contact our office.

 

 

Strategies for companies defending against claims for PTSD

Most plaintiff and defense attorneys would likely admit that treatment of forensic psychological experts and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claims on behalf of their respective clients is difficult.  For the defense of a personal injury claim involving PTSD, it is essential that defense counsel have a thorough understanding of the interaction between the DSM-5, standardized testing, how the testing was scored, whether the tests administered had validity scales, and what other personal historical factors and information the plaintiff’s examining physician had available to him or her.  It is also important to determine whether the plaintiff’s expert considered other mental diseases or defects besides PTSD.  All of this is necessary for thorough cross-examination of a plaintiff’s expert and attacking misdiagnosed claims of PTSD.

There is no single test that will clinically establish the presence of PTSD.  Typically a number of tests such as the MMPI, the TSI or other standardized tests are administered.  Defense counsel should understand whether there are validity scales and what they show and be prepared to cross-examine the plaintiff’s expert in that regard.

Defense counsel should also cross-examine the plaintiff’s expert on his or her awareness of recent longitudinal studies done on PTSD  Defense counsel must determine whether the plaintiff’s expert is an experienced clinician.  What clinical judgment did the plaintiff’s expert apply to reach his or her diagnosis?  Did the plaintiff’s expert account for malingering?  If so, how?

Defense counsel should also cross-examine the plaintiff’s expert extensively on key diagnostic criteria such as “life-threatening” and “persistence”.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) (DSM-IV-TR Code 309.81) is categorized by the DSM-IV(TR) as an Anxiety Disorder.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) will be included in a new chapter in DSM-5 on Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders. This move from DSM-IV, which addressed PTSD as an anxiety disorder, is among several changes approved for this condition that is increasingly at the center of public as well as professional discussion.
The

“The essential feature of PTSD is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person, or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate.”  DSM-IV-TR at p. 463.

The response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror.  In children, the response must involve disorganized or agitated behavior.  Characteristic symptoms include persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, persistence of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness and persistent symptoms of increased arousal.  DSM-IV-TR also states that the full symptom picture must be present for more than one month and the disturbance must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

A nonexclusive list of traumatic events that are experienced directly include military combat, violent personal assault (sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, begin taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp, natural or manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.  For children, sexually traumatic events may include developmentally inappropriate sexual experiences without threatened or actual violence  or injury.

An individual will have persistent symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal that were not present before the trauma.  These symptoms may include difficulty falling or staying asleep that may be due to recurrent nightmares during which the traumatic event is relived, hyper-vigilance, and exaggerated startle response.  Some individuals report irritability or outbursts of anger or difficulty concentrating or completing tasks.

Associated Descriptive Features and Mental Disorders 

Part of the difficulty in an accurate diagnosis of PTSD, is that it is associated with many other anxiety and other mental disorders.  PTSD is also associated with increased rates of Major Depressive Disorder, Substance-Related Disorders, Panic disorder, Agoraphobia, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social Phobia, Specific Phobia, and Bipolar Disorder.  These disorders can either precede, follow, or emerge concurrently with the onset of PTSD.

PTSD Prevalence Rates

The DSM-IV-TR discusses community-based studies which reveal a lifetime prevalence for PTSD of approximately 8% of the adult population in the United States.  Information about general prevalence rates in other countries is not available.   Studies of at-risk individuals yield variable findings, with the highest rates (ranging between one third and more than half of those exposed) found among survivors of rape, military combat and captivity, and ethnically or politically motivated internment and genocide.

Differential Diagnosis

The DSM-IV-TR emphasizes that with PTSD, the stressor must be of an extreme, (i.e., “life-threatening) nature. DSM-IV-TR at p. 467.  In contrast, other mental disorders often mistakenly diagnosed as PTSD include Adjustment Disorder, where the stressor can be of any severity.  The test also points out that not all psychopathology that occurs in individuals exposed to an extreme stressor should necessarily be attributed to PTSD and may be the result of many other mental disorders.  Mentioned are Acute Stress Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Schizophrenia  and other Psychotic Disorders or Mood Disorders with Psychotic Features.  Significantly, the test emphasizes that “[m]alingering should be ruled out in those situations in which financial remuneration, benefit eligibility, and forensic determinations play a role.”  DSM-IV-TR at p. 467.  Although a discussion of all diagnostic criteria is beyond the scope of this article, virtually each of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD emphasize that persistence of the symptoms, the re-experiencing of the event, and the avoidance of associated stimuli is essential.

Conclusion

Even a complete summary of the criteria and methodology for most effectively questioning or attacking a plaintiff’s claim of PTSD is far beyond the scope of this blog post.  Defense counsel must undertake a thorough investigation and consultation with a qualified expert, preferably one who also maintains a clinical practice.  When defense counsel is cross-examining plaintiff’s expert witness regarding a PTSD diagnosis, there is absolutely no substitute for thorough preparation and understanding of the DSM-IV criteria, clinical judgment, test results, current longitudinal or other studies and an awareness of all factors taken into account by plaintiff’s expert as the plain text of the DSM-IV-TR, and examples of the trauma and criteria typically associated with PTSD can often be easily contrasted with the data to disprove or minimize the emotional distress damages.  Olson Brooksby often defends high-exposure personal injury or product liability cases where plaintiffs seek damages for emotional distress and claim PTSD.  For more information, contact our office.