Tag Archives: Aviation

Scott Brooksby featured as moderator regarding helicopter accidents

Scott_0844_bw

Scott Brooksby recently moderated a panel at a prominent aviation conference concerning helicopter accidents.  Scott’s panel was featured at the American Bar Association’s Aviation Litigation National Institute in New York regarding “Helicopter Accidents: A Review of Recent Cases of Interest”.

At this prominent aviation conference, Scott was part of a distinguished faculty, which highlighted current developments in aviation law and insurance topics including:

• Safety in the cockpit issues and precedents that developed from the 9/11 litigation and how they relate to the Germanwings tragedy

• The unique challenges involved in emergency medical helicopter services both from a legal and safety perspective

• Choice of forum and other legal issues and precedents arising from several high profile international disasters

• London market claims leaders’ perspectives on handling aviation disasters spanning the globe

• Flying special missions for government and industry from explosives to ebola

• New developments in the law of aircraft financier liability in connection with the tortious actions of lessees and operators

• Common themes and issues faced by the trial teams in domestic cases such as the Colgan Air 3407 and Comair 5191

• Ethical considerations when selecting and preparing experts in aviation accident litigation

• The future of aviation, aerospace law, and litigation in connection with drones and commercial space/sub-orbital travel

 Scott Brooksby is an aviation lawyer in Portland, Oregon, with experience in a broad variety of aviation topics, including helicopter litigation and crashes.

Scott Brooksby Featured at Prominent Aviation Litigation Conference

SB Maverick

Scott Brooksby will be speaking at the 2014 American Bar Association’s Aviation Litigation Seminar on June 5, 2014, in New York.  Scott’s panel is entitled “Federal Rules of Evidence: New Treatment of NTSB Factual Reports and Underlying Findings.”

The American Bar Association’s Aviation Litigation Seminar enables aviation lawyers to stay up to date on current developments, ethical issues, and new trends in aviation litigation. Scott Brooksby will be featured as part of the distinguished faculty of seasoned litigators, who will address topics such as:

• Significant recent legal developments and case law
• The ethics of prepping and presenting witnesses for deposition or trial
• Impact of unmanned aerial vehicles in aviation litigation
• Effectively handling non-catastrophic aviation cases
• Pilot training issues and litigation
• Recent applications of the General Aviation
Revitalization Act
• Legal, regulatory, and insurance implications of space tourism
• New treatment of NTSB factual reports

Scott Brooksby practices aviation and product liability defense.  He is an experienced trial lawyer who has defended businesses, manufacturers, and organizations in many personal injury and and commercial cases. He has defended and counseled product manufacturers and distributors in a variety of industries including aviation, drugs and medical devices, toys and recreational products, paints and solvents, power tools, heavy equipment and machinery, retail, food, consumer products, and automobiles. He is the former co-chair of a large West Coast law firm’s product liability practice group.

Scott has tried numerous personal injury and product liability cases in Oregon state and federal courts.

In cases that do not necessitate a trial, Scott is a skilled negotiator who has resolved hundreds of cases through arbitration and mediation. He has successfully argued many motions that resulted in the dismissal of claims, or outright dismissal of his client. He also has experience counseling product liability clients regarding the avoidance of litigation, handling product recalls, product modifications, and unwanted governmental intervention.

Scott has litigated everything from small defective product claims to catastrophic injury and wrongful death cases involving punitive damages.  He has experience with medical treatment issues that result from falls, burns and amputation injuries in manufacturing facilities.

As one of the few lawyers in Oregon with significant aviation experience, Scott has litigated helicopter and plane crash cases, as well as aviation component part product liability claims.  Scott was co-counsel on a team that defended a large aviation product manufacturer in a months-long trial.

Aviation Fatalities: Most are Caused by Human Error

Developing and Following Good Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) and Crew Resource Management (“CRM”) Procedures Are the Keys to Avoiding Aviation Fatalities

The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) recently released its statistical data calculating transportation fatalities across all modes of transportation in 2011.  There were 494 fatalities in aviation.  The breakdown was as follows: general aviation, 444; air taxi, 41; foreign/unregistered, 9; airlines, 0; commuter, 0.[1]

In comparing the 2011 data against the prior decade or so, there are certainly positive signs.  But, like all raw statistics, the numbers are most useful when integrated into a longitudinal data comparison from which conclusions are drawn.  The NTSB fatality statistics draw a conclusion that might not be obvious from the 2011 data alone: Human error absolutely dominates as the leading cause of aviation fatalities (and injuries).

There are two keys to avoiding aviation fatalities: developing and following good SOPs and CRM procedures.  This article will examine some of the persistent human causes of aviation accidents, many of which are merely outgrowths of the failure of aviation organizations to develop, adhere to, and not willfully disregard SOPs.  The second cause of aviation fatalities examined in this article is the failure of flight deck crews to follow CRM procedures.  Complications that lead to failure to follow CRM procedures include factors such as cockpit chaos; multi-lingual cockpits; failure to maintain cockpit discipline; surprise; and failure, during emergencies, to rely on the crew member with the most flight time, if appropriate given the constitution of the crew as a whole.

Accidents Can Be Avoided Through Proper Cockpit Procedures and Compliance With SOPs

On September 16, 2013, NTSB Member Robert Sumwalt (“Member Sumwalt”) gave a presentation to the Southern California Aviation Association[2] on the importance of SOPs.  Member Sumwalt, quoting from an NTSB accident report, noted that, “[w]ell-designed cockpit procedures are an effective countermeasure against operational errors, and disciplined compliance with SOPs, including strict cockpit discipline, provides the basis for effective crew coordination and performance.”[3]

Member Sumwalt then presented facts about what the accident data show regarding crew-caused accidents.  In an NTSB study of 37 crew-caused air carrier accidents between 1978 and 1990, procedural errors, such as not making required callouts or failing to use appropriate checklists, were found in 29 of the 37 (78%) reviewed accidents.  The accident data also show that, with respect to turbine-powered operations (2001-2010), the NTSB identified at least 86 accidents involving lack of adequate procedures, policies, or checklists, or lack of flight crew adherence to procedures, policies, or checklists.  These accidents resulted in 149 fatalities.[4]

Developing Effective SOPs

The development of SOPs in various industries has been accomplished through a variety of regulatory bodies, industry groups, and volunteerism.  One of the first groups to establish such guidelines was the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH), which defines SOPs as “detailed written instructions to achieve uniformity of the performance of a specific function.”  The international quality standard (“ISO”) 9001 essentially requires the establishment of SOPs for any manufacturing process that could affect the quality of the product.  Although ICH’s implementation of the ISO 9001 SOPs was in the context of clinical drug trials, a substantially similar system has been expanded to other industries.[5]

In the context of aviation, the SOP provides a flight crew with a step-by-step guide to effectively and safely carry out operations.  A particular SOP must not only achieve the task at hand but also be understood by a crew of various backgrounds and experiences within the organization.  SOPs can also be developed over time to incorporate improvements based on experience, accidents, near misses, or innovations from other manufacturers or operators to suit the needs of a particular organization.  SOPs can also provide employees with a reference to common business practices, activities, or tasks.[6]  New employees use SOPs to answer questions without having to interrupt supervisors to ask how an operation is performed.[7]

Although reference is made to ISO 9001 in the context of clinical trials, the ISO 9000 family of standards is related to quality management systems and designed to help organizations follow consistent procedures to meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders.[8]  “AS 9000” is the Aerospace Basic Quality System Standard–an interpretation developed and adopted by virtually all the major aerospace manufacturers.  The current version is AS 9100C.  A new version of the standard will be published in September 2015 if the ISO members vote favorably in March 2015.[9]

The Failure of Flight Crews to Comply With SOPs and the Consequences

During his remarks on flight crew error, Member Sumwalt cited a Boeing study of accident prevention strategies where the data suggested that the single most important factor in prevention of hull loss accidents over a ten-year period was pilot flying (PF) adherence to SOPs.  Member Sumwalt noted that SOPs are typically not followed for three specific reasons.  He discussed each reason, and then used data from an NTSB investigation, or preliminary cause report, as support or illustration for each of the three reasons.

The reasons SOPs are typically not followed are:

(1) the organization lacks adequate SOPs;

(2) the organization doesn’t adhere to their SOPs; and

(3) flight crews intentionally disregard SOPs.

SOPs should be clear, comprehensive, and readily available in the manuals used by flight deck crew members.[10]  Member Sumwalt provided three real-life corollary examples:

  • The Organization Lacks Adequate SOPs – Crash of East Coast Jets, Hawker Beechcraft BAe 800, on July 31, 2008, Owatonna, Minnesota (8 fatalities)

The NTSB found that, although as a charter operator, East Coast Jets was not required to incorporate SOPs into its operations manual, if it had done so, it may have supported the accident pilots in establishing cockpit discipline and, therefore, a safer cockpit environment.  An example was provided where the SOP identifies the triggering event, designates which crewmember performs the action or callout, what the callout is, and what the action is.

  • The Organization Fails to Adhere to Its Established SOPs – Crash of Cessna 310, N501N, July 10, 2007, Sanford, Florida (5 fatalities)

In this case the organization did not adhere to SOPs.  The aviation director could not locate the SOP manual, which was viewed as merely a training tool.  The aircraft was to be used only for company business, but the accident flight was a personal flight.  The Pilot in Command (“PIC”) must possess an Airline Transport Pilot (“ATP”) Certificate/Rating, but the PIC did not possess the necessary ATP.  The last three maintenance discrepancies had not been addressed.  The NTSB noted that these lapses were contrary to industry guidelines directing that procedures should be written in accordance with the organization’s operating methods, and once the procedures are in place, the organization should make every effort to follow those procedures.  Having a strong commitment to standardization and discipline were among the key elements of safe operations observed in a Boeing study.  Cockpit procedural language is tightly controlled to maintain consistency and to avoid confusion from non-standard callouts.  Callouts and responses should be done verbatim.[11]

  • Flight Crews Intentionally Disregard Established SOPs – Hard Landing of US Airways Express, January 19, 2010, Charleston, West Virginia

The NTSB probable cause determination was “the flight crewmembers’ unprofessional behavior, including their non-adherence to sterile cockpit procedures by engaging in non-pertinent conversation, which distracted them from their primary flight-related duties and led to their failure to correctly set and verify the flaps.”  Intentional crew non-compliance was a factor in 40% of the worldwide accidents reviewed.[12]

NTSB Member Sumwalt concluded by noting that well-designed SOPs are essential for safety.  Making a strong commitment to procedural compliance should be a core value of the organization.  The SOPs must not merely exist, but they must be religiously followed as a way of doing business.

Well-Coordinated CRM is a Crucial Part of Accident Prevention

CRM[13] is a set of training procedures for use in environments where human error can have devastating effects.  Used primarily for improving air safety, CRM focuses on interpersonal communication, leadership, and decision making in the cockpit.

CRM grew out of an NTSB analysis of the crash of United Airlines flight 173 where the plane, a DC-8, ran out of fuel while troubleshooting a landing gear problem over Portland Oregon.[14]  The NTSB issued its landmark recommendation on June 7, 1979, to require CRM training for airline crews.  A few weeks later, NASA held a workshop on the topic, endorsing this innovative training.[15]  United Airlines was the first airline to provide CRM training for its cockpit crews in 1981.[16]

Since that time, CRM training concepts have been modified for application to a wide range of activities where people must make dangerous time-critical decisions.  These arenas include air traffic control, ship handling, firefighting, and medical operating rooms.[17]

The Difficulty of Precisely Executing CRM Procedures In a Multicultural Cockpit

Multiculturalism in the cockpit is a largely recent phenomenon.  Globalization and shrinking militaries around the world have led to a decrease in the availability of trained pilots, a lack of homogenous flight crews, and the emergence of multicultural cockpits.  In 2005, a Helios Airways Boeing 737-300, with its pilots incapacitated by hypoxia after they failed to recognize a cabin pressurization system malfunction, provides a good example of what can happen when communication and crew resource management break down in the multicultural cockpit.[18]  All 121 people on the airplane were killed when the 737 depressurized and ran out of fuel, the engines flamed out, and the airplane crashed, after what was to have been a flight from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Prague, Czech Republic, with a stop in Athens.

In its final report on the accident, the Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board said the crew had failed to recognize that the cabin pressurization mode selector was in the wrong position.  The Helios crew exhibited poor CRM before takeoff and during climb, and the difference in their nationalities and primary languages–the captain was German, the first officer was Cyprian–contributed to poor communication during the event.  A blaring cabin altitude warning horn and the illumination of master caution lights degraded the crew’s cognitive abilities and processes.  Inter-cockpit communications were reduced, perhaps in part because English was a second or third language for the crew.[19]

The CRM Lessons Learned From Air France 447–“Crew Coordination Vanished”

On March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747s crashed on the single runway on the Spanish island of Tenerife, killing 583 people.  More than 35 years later, it is still measured by the number of casualties, and is by far the worst aviation disaster in history.  One aspect of the accident, unlike many tragic and significant disasters, is that the non-aviation community was fixated on the Tenerife crash, the individuals involved, and exactly what the sequence of events was.  Arguably the next time both the aviation community and the non-aviation community became as fixated on an aviation disaster was the 2009 crash of Air France 447.[20]

Within four and a half minutes in the early hours of June 1, 2009, an Airbus A330-200 operating as Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, departed from cruise flight at 35,000 feet and descended into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 216 passengers and 12 crewmembers.  Glimpses of what may have gone wrong emerged from the several interim reports issued by the French Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses (BEA) during the long investigation.  In July, 2012, the BEA issues a nearly 300-page final report.

According to the report, the trouble began when the A330’s pitot tubes were obstructed by ice crystals, causing the various air data sources to produce unreliable airspeed information.  Reacting as designed, the autopilot and autothrottle disengaged, and reverted to a lower control law that provides fewer protections against flight-envelope deviations.  Startled, the pilot flying (“PF”) inadvertently commanded a steep nose-up pitch change while leveling the airplane’s wings.  The flight crew–a copilot and a relief pilot filling in for the resting captain–recognized the loss of reliable airspeed data but did not conduct the associated checklist procedure.  As a result, “[c]onfusion reigned on the flight deck, and crew coordination vanished.” [21]  Without automatic angle-of-attack protection, the airplane entered a stall.  The crew either believed that the stall warnings were spurious or mistook the airframe buffeting as a sign of an overspeed condition.  When the resting captain was called to return to the flight deck, he continued to apply nose-up flight inputs, when, at such a low altitude, the only possible chance to get the plane back into the flight envelope would have been nose-down inputs.  In addition, the PF almost immediately took back priority without any callout and continued piloting.  The priority takeover by the PF contributed to the de-structuring of the task-sharing between the pilots.  No recovery action was taken, and the A330 remained in a stall as it descended into the sea.

Additional sections of the BEA final report comment on the fragmented nature of the augmented crew, and the fact that some junior officers had far more flight hours in type than some of the more senior crew members, further eroding the opportunity for effective CRM in a surprise situation.

SOPs and CRM Must be Properly Implemented and Adhered To

Disciplined implementation of, and adherence to, SOPs is inseparable from the disciplined implementation of, and adherence to, CRM.  Although this article only scratches the surface on data supporting this conclusion, it is an irrebuttable presumption that if flight crews fully embrace SOPs and CRM, flying will be safer.


[1] Data and Statistics-NTSB-National Transportation Safety Board http://www.ntsb.gov/data/index.html (last visited, October 18, 2013).

[2] Member Robert L. Sumwalt, Standard Operating Procedures:  The Backbone of Professional Flight Operations,  http://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches_sumwalt.html  September 16, 2013 (last visited October 18, 2013) (unpaginated).

[3] Id. (citing from National Transportation Safety Board Accident Report NTSB/AAR-11/01, PB2011-910401, Crash During Attempted Go-Around After Landing, East Coast Jets Flight 81, Hawker Beechcraft Corporation, 125-800A, N818MV, Owatonna, Minnesota, July 31, 2008).

[4] Id.

[5] ICH Harmonized Tripartite Guidelines For Good Clinical Practice. (1.55.)  May 1, 1996.

[6] Green, R. G., Muir, H., James, M., Gradwell, D., & Green, R. L. (1996) Human Factors for Pilots (2nd ed). Ashgate Publishing Ltd (Hants, England), 1996.

[7] Anderson, Chris.  How to Write Standard Operating Procedures.  Bizmanualz, June 4, 2012.

[8] Poksinska, Bozena; Dahlgaard, Jens Jörn; Antoni, Marc (2002). The State of ISO 9000 Certification: A Study of Swedish Organizations. The TQM Magazine 14 (5): 297.

[9] Nigel H. Croft (2012). ISO 9001:2015 and Beyond – Preparing for the Next 25 Years of Quality Management Standards“. ISO.

[10] FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-71.

[11] Reference to Lautman-Gallimore Study.  Member Robert L. Sumwalt, Standard Operating Procedures:  The Backbone of Professional Flight Operations  http://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches_sumwalt.html  September 16, 2013 (last visited October 18, 2013) (unpaginated).

[12] R. Khatwa & R. Helmreich, cited in Member Robert L. Sumwalt, Standard Operating Procedures:  The Backbone of Professional Flight Operations  http://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches_sumwalt.html  September 16, 2013 (last visited October 18, 2013) (unpaginated).

[13] Diehl, Alan (2013) “Air Safety Investigators: Using Science to Save Lives-One Crash at a Time.” Xlibris Corporation. ISBN 9781479728930. http://www.prweb.com/releases/DrAlanDiehl/AirSafetyInvestigators/prweb10735591.htm.

[14] UNITED AIR LINES, INC. “McDONNELL-DOUGLAS DC-8-61, N8082U PORTLAND, OREGON : DECEMBER 28, 1978.” National Transportation Safety Board. December 28, 1978. 9 (15/64).

[15] Cooper, G.E., White, M.D., & Lauber, J.K. (Eds.) 1980. “Resource Management on the Flight Deck,” Proceedings of a NASA/Industry Workshop (NASA CP-2120).

[16] Helmreich, R. L.; Merritt, A. C.; Wilhelm, J. A. (1999).  “The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation.”  International Journal of Aviation Psychology.  9 (1): 19–32.

[17] Diehl, Alan (June, 1994). “Crew Resource Management… It’s Not Just for Fliers Anymore.” Flying Safety, USAF Safety Agency.

[18] Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board.  Aircraft Accident Report 11/2006, Helios Airways Flight HCY522, Boeing 737-315, at Grammatiko, Hellas, 14 August 2005.

[19] Id.

[20] The following summary of the facts and conclusions associated with AF 447 is based on the English translation of the BEA’s “Final Report on the Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203, Registered F-CZCP, operated by Air France, Flight AF 447, Rio de Janeiro-Paris”.  The report is available in English and the original French at www.bea.aero.

[21] Mark Lacagnina, Sustained Stall: Blocked Pitot Tubes, Excessive Control Inputs and Cockpit Confusion Doomed Air France 447, http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/august-2012/sustained-stall (accessed October 22, 2013).

Turbine Engine Hot Section Manufacturing: Complex Metallurgy and Dangerous Work Environments

Turbine engine hot section manufacturing is a complex industry that involves risk of serious injury and an adherence to safety rules and best practices.

There is a common maxim that two technologies liberated the modern world: the automatic washing machine and the jet engine.  When RAF Lieutenant Frank Whittle received an English patent on the basic design for the modern jet engine in 1930 (the first flight was not until 1941), he probably could not have imagined the changes that would occur, in materials, complexity, and performance capability.

Today’s commercial jet engines have as many as 25,000 parts.  They are up to eleven feet in diameter and twelve feet long.  The engines can weigh more than 10,000 pounds and produce 100,000 pounds of thrust.  Even the engine on a fully tested and approved design may take two years to assemble.  A super-jumbo jet can carry 500-800 passengers, depending on configuration, and have a take-off weight of 1.2 million pounds.

Section I will provide a basic overview of the production and metallurgical complexities associated with the manufacture of some hot section components.  Section II will address a unique aspect of jet hot section manufacturing.  Specifically, the complex and exacting standards required to avoid catastrophic in-flight aviation accidents also require the most disciplined adherence to best practices for safety to avoid catastrophic occupational injury, particularly burns, in high temperature work environments.  Section III will briefly discuss the catastrophic burn injuries that result from failure to follow exacting safety precautions.

Section I:  The Hot Section

At the front of the engine, a fan drives air into the engine’s first compartment, the compressor, a space approximately 20 times smaller than the first stage of the compressor.   As the air leaves the high-pressure compressor and enters the combustor, it mixes with fuel and is burned.  As the gas is combusted and expands, some gas passes through the exhaust and some is rerouted to the engine’s turbine (a set of fans that rotate compressor blades).  The turbine extracts energy from the ultra-hot gases to power the compressor shaft and generate power.

Because the turbine is subject to such incredible heat, labyrinthine airways in the turbine blades allow cool air to pass through them to cool the turbine.  With the cooling mechanism of the airstream, the turbine can function in gas streams where the temperature is higher than the melting point of the alloy from which the turbine is made.

Titanium, purified to aviation specifications in the 1950s, is used for the most critical components of the “hot section” such as the combustion chamber and turbine.  The hardness of titanium is difficult to work with, but it is resistant to extreme heat.  It is often alloyed with other metals such as nickel and aluminum for high strength/weight ratios.

Hot Section Component Manufacturing

The intake fan.  The fan must be strong so it does not fracture if large birds or debris are sucked in.  It is made of a titanium alloy.  Each fan blade consists of two skins produced by shaping molten titanium in a hot press.  Each blade skin is welded to a mate, with a hollow cavity in the center being filled with titanium honeycomb.

The compressor disc. This is a solid core, resembling a notched wheel, to which the compressor blades are attached.  It must be free of even minute imperfections, since these could cause creeping or develop into fractures under the tremendous stress of engine operation.  Historically machined, compressor discs are now manufactured through a process called powder metallurgy, which consists of pouring molten metal onto a rapidly rotating turntable that breaks the molten metal into millions of microscopic droplets that are flung back up almost immediately, due to the table’s spinning.  As they leave the turntable, the droplets’ temperature plummets by 2120 degrees Fahrenheit (1000 degrees Celsius) in half a second, causing them to solidify and form a very fine metal powder, which solidifies too quickly to absorb impurities.  The powder is packed into a forming case and vibrated in a vacuum to remove air.  The case is then sealed and heated, under 25,000 pounds of pressure per square, inch into a disc.

Compressor blades.  These blades are still formed by traditional methods of casting.  Alloy is poured into a ceramic mold, heated in a furnace, and cooled.  The mold is broken and blades are machined to final shape, often to exacting tolerances on the order of 7 microns.

Combustion chambers.  Combustion chambers blend air and fuel in small spaces for long periods of time at incredible temperatures.  Titanium is alloyed (to increase ductility) and then heated to liquid before being poured into several complex segment molds.  The segments are welded together after cooling and removal.

The turbine disc and blades.  The turbine disc is formed by the same powder metallurgy used to create the compressor disc.  However, turbine blades are subjected to even greater stress due to the intense heat of the combustor.  Copies of the blades are formed by pouring wax into metal molds.  Once set, the wax shape is removed and immersed in a ceramic slurry bath, forming a ceramic coating.  Each cluster of shapes is heated to harden the ceramic and melt the wax.  Molten metal is then poured into the hollow left by the melted wax.

The metal grains of the blades are then aligned parallel to the blade by directional solidifying, which is important due to the blade stresses.  If the grains are aligned correctly, the blade is much less likely to fracture.  The solidifying process takes place in computer-controlled ovens to precise specifications.  Parallel lines of tiny holes are formed to supplement internal cooling passageways, either by a small laser beam or by spark erosion, where sparks are carefully allowed to eat holes in the blade.

Turbine blades are subject to temperatures of around 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit (1,370 Celsius.  At such temperatures, creep, corrosion, and fatigue failures are all possible.  Thermal barrier coatings, such as aluminide coatings developed during the 1970s, facilitated cooling.  Ceramic coatings developed during the 1980s improved blade capability by about 200 degrees F. and nearly doubled blade life.

Modern turbine blades often use nickel-based superalloys that incorporate chromium, cobalt, and rhenium.  Some superalloys incorporate crystal technology.  Nimonic is another super low-creep superalloy used in turbine blades.  Titanium aluminide, a chemical compound with excellent mechanical properties at elevated temperatures, may replace Ni based superalloys in turbine blades.  GE uses titanium aluminide on low pressure turbine blades on the GEnx engine powering Boeing 787s.  The blades are cast by Precision Castparts Corp.

Exhaust system.  The inner duct and afterburners are molded from titanium, while the outer duct and nacelle are formed from Kevlar, with all components welded into a subassembly.

Section II.  Defects in Both Hot Section Components and Safety Procedures Can Result in Catastrophic Injuries

An imperfection in the hot section, which results, for example, in a blade fracture during flight, or excessive creep, may result in an uncontrolled engine failure, among other catastrophic inflight mishaps, putting lives at risk.  In an interesting corollary, unique to very few manufacturing settings, adherence to the safest manufacturing processes will minimize both product defects and worker injuries, primarily serious burns.

Few Things Drive Higher Verdicts, Workers Compensation Costs, or Settlements, Than Burns

In those industries where “serious large burns” can arbitrarily be defined as full-thickness burns over 20% or more of the total body surface area (TBSA), the location of the burns and the relative availability of certain types of grafts can be outcome determinative and correlate directly with litigation risk, settlements, and verdicts. Most problematic are 4th degree burns to the hands or face, which can never, ever, be fully repaired with current surgical technology or therapeutic treatments.

Skin Graft Classification

There are two common types of skin grafts.  A split-thickness graft (STSG), or mesh graft, includes the epidermis and part of the dermis.  A mesher makes apertures in the graft, allowing it to expand approximately 9 times its original size.

Alternatively, a full thickness skin graft, or sheet graft, which involves pitching and cutting away skin from the donor section, is more risky in terms of rejection.  Yet counter-intuitively, this method leaves a scar only on the donor section, heals more quickly, and is less painful than split-thickness grafting.  This type of grafting, sheet grafting, must be used for hands and faces/heads where graft contraction must be minimized, and it is therefore extremely difficult to achieve in large TBSA burns.

Remedies

Although workers compensation laws will generally bar litigation by workers against their employers, in cases where the exclusive remedy provision of workers compensation does not apply, it is not uncommon in the United States to see burn verdicts or settlements in the millions or even tens of millions of dollars.  Mandatory PPE and best safety practices for dealing with ultra-high temperature work environments can minimize injuries, although the practical reality is that elimination of such injuries remains an aspirational goal.

Steelmaking In The 21st Century: An Ancient Art, A Complex Modern Science, A Danger At Every Stage

Metal briefcase

Product liability lawyers should be familiar with both the dangers and the science of steel manufacturing.  Steel is one of the most indispensable products in the modern world.  Its uses, forms, and composition are limitless.  Like any other product, steel in its final form and use is a “product” subject to the same consumer expectation test in Oregon that applies to household appliances.  However, unlike most other product manufacturing, steel production, which creates the base material for pipe, rails, aviation, and innumerable transportation, mining, oil and gas, and other products, is incredibly dangerous.  Although serious burns might be the most obvious risk, there are also crush, amputation, and a host of other potential injuries which justify the most careful training, exacting safety processes, and best PPE.  This is especially true given the danger posed by the typical 24-hour-a-day production schedules and the undisputed fact that nighttime workers are in more danger than day workers.

Steelmaking Is An Ancient Art

In the ancient world, steelmaking was considered an art, and as the centuries passed, the process became more and more complex.  Steel was known in antiquity and may have been produced by managing bloomeries, or iron-smelting facilities, in which the bloom contained carbon.  Blooms are steel formed into large blocks to which further tempering or chemical procedures can be applied.  The use of blooms persists into the steelmaking of today.

The earliest known example of steel production, thought to be about 4000 years old, is a piece of ironware excavated from an archaeological site in Anatolia (the Asian part of Turkey).  “Ironware piece unearthed from Turkey found to be oldest steel.”  The Hindu (Chennai, India).  The Haya people of East Africa invented a type of furnace that they used to make carbon steel at 3,276 degrees Fahrenheit nearly 2000 years ago.  Africa’s Ancient Steelmakers (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,912179,00.html?promoid=googlep).  Time Magazine September 25, 1978.

What Is Steel?

Steel is an alloy of iron and carbon.  Steelmaking is the process of producing steel from iron and ferrous scrap.  In steelmaking today, impurities such as silicon, phosphorus, and excess carbon are removed from the raw iron, and alloying elements such as manganese, nickel, chromium, and vanadium are added to produce different grades of steel.  Limiting dissolved gasses such as nitrogen and oxygen, and entrained impurities or “inclusions,” in the steel is also important to ensure the quality of the products cast from the liquid steel.  B. Deo and R. Boom, Fundamentals of Steelmaking Metallurgy, Prentice and Hall (1993).

Carbon is the primary alloying element, and its content in steel is between 0.002% and 2.1% by weight.  Additional elements are also present in steel, including manganese, phosphorous, sulfur, silicon, and traces of oxygen, nitrogen, and aluminum.  Carbon and other elements act as hardening agents, preventing dislocations in the iron atom crystal lattice from sliding past one another.

Varying the amount of alloying elements and the form of their presence in the steel (solute elements precipitated phase) controls qualities such as the hardness, ductility, and tensile strength of the resulting steel.  Steel with increased carbon content can be made harder and stronger than iron, but such steel is also less ductile than iron.  Ashby, Michael F. and Jones, David R.H.  Engineering Materials 2 (with corrections ed.) Oxford:  Pergamom Press.  ISBN 0-08-032532-7 (1992 [1986]).

Alloys with a higher than 2.1% carbon content are categorized as cast iron.  Because cast iron is not malleable even when hot, it can be worked only by casting, where it has a lower melting point.  Steel is also distinguishable from wrought iron, which may contain a small amount of carbon.

Even in the narrow range of concentrations that make up steel, mixtures of carbon and iron can form a number of different structures with very different properties.  One of the most important polymorphic forms of steel is martensite, a metastable phase that is significantly stronger than other steel phases.  When the steel is in an austenitic phase and then quenched rapidly, it forms into martensite, as the atoms “freeze” in place when the cell structure changes from FCC to BCC.  Depending on the carbon content, the martensitic phase takes different forms.  Below approximately 2% carbon, it takes a ferrite BCC crystal form, but at a higher carbon content, it takes a body-centered tetragonal (BCT) structure.  There is no thermal activation energy for the transformation from austenite to martensite.  Moreover, there is no compositional change to the atoms, which generally retain their same neighbors.  Smith, William F., Hashemi, Jared, Foundations of Materials Science and Engineering (4th ed 2006) McGraw Hill ISBN 0-07-295358-6.

Special Modern High Performance Alloys

There are a number of extremely complex super-alloys and other metals available today for high performance aviation and other uses, including Transformation Induced Plasticity (TRIP) steel and Twinning Induced Plasticity (TWIP) steel.  A complete discussion of these super-alloys merits a separate article, and one will be forthcoming shortly.

Introduction To The Modern Process

In the modern era, there are two major processes for making steel.  The first is basic oxygen steelmaking, which uses liquid pig iron from the blast furnace and scrap steel for the main feed materials.  Alternatively, iron ore is reduced or smelted with coke and limestone in the blast furnace, producing molten iron that is either cast into pic iron or carried to the next stage as molten iron.  In the second stage, impurities such as sulfur, phosphorus, and excess carbon are removed, and the alloying elements such as manganese, nickel, chromium, and vanadium are added to produce the steel required.  The vast majority of steel in the world is produced using the basic oxygen furnace.  In 2011, approximately 70% of the world’s steel was produced in this way.  R. Fruehan, The Making, Shaping and Treating of Steel (11th ed. AIST 1999).

The second major modern process is electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking, which either uses scrap steel or direct reduced iron (DRI) as the main feed material.  Oxygen steelmaking is fuelled predominantly by the exothermic nature of the reactions inside the vessel, whereas in EAF steelmaking, electrical energy is used to melt the solid scrap and/or DRI materials.

In recent times, EAF steelmaking technology has moved closer to Oxygen steelmaking as more chemical energy is introduced into the process.  E.T. Turkdogan, Fundamentals of Steelmaking, IOM (1996).  EAF steelmaking is predominantly used for producing steel from scrap and involves melting scrap, and combining it with iron ore.

Alternatively, the oxygen method can involve melting DRI using electric arcs (either AC or DC).  It is common to start the melt with a “hot heel” (molten steel from a previous heat) and use gas burners to assist with the meltdown of the pile of scrap.  EAF furnaces typically have capacities of around 100 tons every 40 to 50 minutes.

Regardless of the process used, through casting, hot rolling and cold rolling, the steel mill then turns the molten steel into blooms, ingots, slabs, and sheet.

At the typical steel mill, the raw materials are batched into a blast furnace where the iron compounds in the ore give up excess oxygen and become liquid iron.  At intervals of a few hours, the accumulated liquid iron is tapped from the blast furnace and either cast into pig iron or directed to other vessels for further steelmaking operations.  During the casting process, various methods are used, such as the addition of aluminum so that impurities in the steel float to the surface where they can be cut off the finished bloom.

Conclusion

The steelmaking process involves exposure to hundreds of tons of molten metals, often poured manually into ceramic, wax, or other casting forms or hot rolled into shapes.  The potential for catastrophic injury or death is everywhere in the steelmaking process, and it is essential that workers be trained and supervised to avoid lapses in safety that could result in such unfortunate occurrences.  Although automation continuously decreases the exposure of workers to significant injury or death as a result of virtually every phase of the process, the utmost care should still be exercised by all who enter a steel mill.

NTSB Releases Fatality Statistics for 2011

A helicopter releases fire-suppressant chemicals on a forest fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) has recently released aviation data and statistics for transportation fatalities in 2011.  According to the NTSB, there were 494 aviation fatalities in 2011.  The breakdown on these statistics includes:  General Aviation (444); Air Taxi (41) Foreign/Unregistered (9); Airlines (0) and Commuter (0).

Olson Brooksby practices a wide variety of aviation law.  We have experience representing commercial and local airlines, aviation insurers, aviation product manufacturers, and airplane owners.  Our attorneys have handled a broad variety of aviation law matters, including personal injury defense; UCC litigation; product liability defense litigation; contract and lease drafting; contract negotiation and disputes; assistance with fuel contracts; and general aviation commercial litigation.  We also provide counseling regarding insurance, risk assessment, and best practices.

Much of the firm’s practice is devoted to aviation law, and we are one of the few firms in Oregon with aviation trial experience.  Scott Brooksby leads our aviation practice, devoting a substantial amount of his time and practice to aviation-related matters.  Mr. Brooksby served as local counsel for one of the largest aviation manufacturers in the world in a nine-week trial in Oregon state court.  The trial involved product liability issues and concerned a helicopter crash that resulted in burns, permanent injuries, and multiple deaths.  Mr. Brooksby is on the aviation subcommittee of the American Bar Association’s Mass Torts section.  Mr. Brooksby has also been featured as a speaker and a moderator at aviation conferences around the country, including the American Bar Association’s Aviation Litigation National Institute in New York, New York.

While Olson Brooksby’s specialized aviation practice is headquartered in Portland, Oregon, the nature of our practice often takes us to various other geographical locations, particularly for investigations, witness interviews, and depositions.

There are important advantages to hiring experienced aircraft accident defense attorneys who have investigated and successfully litigated numerous aircraft, helicopter, and commercial aircraft accidents and who have the technical knowledge to hire the right experts. Our aviation attorneys are familiar with allegations concerning: mechanical malfunctions due to airframe or component defects; improper repair or maintenance; improper weight and balance; weather; piloting and human factors; instruments and avionics; air traffic control; and even issues relating to bird strikes and lasers.  Our aviation attorneys have familiarity with the procedures of the NTSB and the FAA, and we have experience with document requests and evidence rules concerning NTSB reports.  Scott Brooksby has experience working with NTSB employees, both within the context of litigation as well as outside of the courtroom at aviation conferences.

Component Part Manufacturer Liability in Oregon

Oregon Did Not Adopt Caveat (3) In Its Adoption of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965)

Component part liability is important in products liability cases and especially in aviation cases, where the aircraft may have a long air-frame life but require service or replacements of hundreds of parts over its years of service.  Although Oregon adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A contains a caveat (Caveat 3 (1965)) regarding whether strict liability should be extended to component part manufacturers.  The Oregon Legislature, however, did not adopt this caveat as an interpretive guide for the courts.  Therefore, both pre-codification and post-codification Oregon Supreme Court rulings hold that strict liability can extend to component part manufacturers for the sale of defective components.  See State ex rel Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or 381 (1982); Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 269 Or 643 (1974) (fabric manufacturer held liable because of flammable character of fabric, even though fabric was sold to the coat manufacturer before reaching consumer).  If the component part is dangerously defective and it causes injury, the component part manufacturer (or seller or distributor) is subject to liability.

Oregon law also follows the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which takes the position that if the component part is defective and causes injury, the component part manufacturer (or seller or distributor) is subject to liability.  Additionally, if the component part manufacturer “substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product,” the component manufacturer is subject to liability. Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability § 5 (1998).

Oregon Law Involving Alleged Misapplication of a Raw Material:  Misapplication of a Raw Material Does Not Give Rise To Liability As To the Supplier

The manufacturer of a component part, however, is not subject to strict liability if the component was misapplied rather than defectively designed.  In Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 134 Or App 271 (1995), after experiencing problems with her temporomandibular joint (TMJ), the joint that connects the jaw bone to the skull, the plaintiff, Hoyt, had a prosthetic device implanted in her jaw.  The device gradually fragmented and released particles of Teflon, which caused a serious adverse reaction.  Du Pont Company manufactured Teflon and sold it to Vitek, Inc., which used the Teflon as a component part in its TMJ device.

Vitek designed, manufactured and marketed the device.  In 1977 DuPont informed Vitek that it manufactured Teflon for industrial purposes only and had sought no FDA rulings on the safety or effectiveness of surgical uses, and that Vitek would have to rely on its own medical and legal judgment.  Du Pont was aware of studies that warned of abrasion and fragmentation with medical Teflon implants and passed along this information to Vitek.  In 1983, Vitek received permission from the FDA to market the device pending “specific performance standards.”  Hoyt, supra, 134 Or App at 277.

Hoyt sued Du Pont, contending that Teflon was unreasonably dangerous because it was defectively designed and because of Du Pont’s failure to warn the medical community.  The court of appeals found that the component part was not defective.  The court of appeals also relied on the “raw material supplier” doctrine in deciding not to apply strict liability.  When a multiuse raw material is not unreasonably dangerous in itself, but becomes unreasonably dangerous when incorporated into certain uses, the supplier cannot be sued based on strict liability.  Hoyt, supra, 134 Or App at 284-286.  See Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F3d 701 (8th Cir 1993); Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F2d 45 (6th Cir 1989).

Cases in Which Component Parts Are the Allegedly Defective Product

Plaintiffs did allege that defective replacement parts were supplied after the first sale of a helicopter in Evans v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 1998 WL 1297138 (D Or 1998), but the service bulletins proffered by plaintiffs were insufficient to establish that the defective component parts were installed in the engine after the first sale.  The helicopter was manufactured in 1979, and crashed seventeen years later.  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis of ORS 30.905 because plaintiffs could not support their allegation that an affirmative misrepresentation occurred after the first sale of the helicopter by defendants.

In Allstate Indem. Co. v. Go Appliances LLC, 2006 WL 2045860 (D Or 2006), plaintiff alleged that a defective compressor installed on a used refrigerator caused a fire in its subrogor’s house.  The opinion does not state when the refrigerator was originally first sold and does not discuss product liability time limitations.  However, the court held that plaintiff could assert a products liability action against the defendant, who sold the used appliance and installed the allegedly defective new compressor.

The statute of ultimate repose in both strict product liability cases and negligence cases is beyond the scope of this article.  However, one of the controlling Oregon cases relevant to a replacement component part is Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 303 Or 281 (1987), mod. on recons. 303 Or 452.  Although Erickson discussed the application of the products liability statute of ultimate repose in the context of post-sale negligent misrepresentation, the case is relevant to a discussion regarding application of the statute of ultimate repose to a post- sale installation of a defective component part.

In Erickson, plaintiff purchased a helicopter in 1971.  Defendant allegedly made misrepresentations regarding the useful safe life of a compressor disc in 1977.  After the helicopter crashed in 1981 due to exhaustion of the compressor disc, plaintiff filed suit in 1983.  The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant was negligent in providing erroneous information, failing to warn plaintiff as to the erroneous information, and failing to warn that the helicopter was dangerous after expiration of the true safe life of the compressor disc.  Erickson, 303 Or at 284-85.

The Oregon Court of Appeals found that plaintiff’s action against the manufacturer was a product liability action, and that because the action was commenced more than eight years after the first purchase of the helicopter, the statute of ultimate repose barred the action.  Id. at 285-86.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:  “ORS 30.905 applies only to acts, omissions or conditions existing or occurring before or at the ‘date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption.’  Acts or omissions occurring after that date are governed by the statute of ultimate repose contained in ORS 12.115.”[1]  Id. at 286.  Because the defendant relayed the false information about the useful safe life of the compressor after the helicopter was first purchased, ORS 30.905 did not apply.  Id. at 289. (“The difference between the present case and the type of case that the legislature meant to cover under ORS 30.905(1) is that, in this negligence case, the reasonableness of certain of defendant’s actions after plaintiff’s purchase are in question while, in a product liability case governed by ORS 30.905, it is the condition of the article at the date of purchase that is in question.”) (emphasis in original).

The Erickson holding, when viewed in the context of installations of new components, supports the argument that such alterations cannot “restart” the statute of ultimate repose on the original product.  Erickson holds that ORS 30.905 only applies to “acts, omissions or conditions existing or occurring before or at the ‘date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption,’” and a post-sale negligent misrepresentation leading to the installation of a new product necessarily occurs after the date the product was first purchased.  A manufacturer can argue that under Erickson, the statute of ultimate repose should run on the original product from the date it entered the stream of commerce, regardless of whether component parts were installed post sale.

 

 


[1] ORS 12.115 is the generic statute of ultimate repose for negligence actions, and provides that “any action for negligent injury to person or property of another” must be commenced within “10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”

Effective Cross-Examination of Plaintiff’s Psychological Expert Can Reduce or Eliminate Damages for Misdiagnosed Claims of PTSD

Jurors in the jury box

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) is a mental disorder within the trauma and stressor-related disorders included in The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM-5.  It was previously categorized in the anxiety classification of disorders in the “DSM-IV”.

Personal injury, product liability, and aviation defense lawyers should be well prepared to cross-examine forensic psychologists who testify on behalf of plaintiffs that they suffer from PTSD.  Reasons for thorough preparation include the frequent lack of critical information regarding a plaintiff’s background, inadequate psychological testing, improper reading of validity scales, or an absence of reliance on any other data or criteria by the forensic psychologist testifying on behalf of plaintiff.  If defense counsel is thoroughly familiar with the DSM-5 (and its criteria and commentary on PTSD) and is prepared for an effective cross-examination of plaintiff’s treating or forensic psychologist, damages for emotional distress in PTSD claims can be significantly reduced or eliminated.

Olson Brooksby primarily defends product liability, higher exposure personal injury, and aviation cases.  Over the past few years, we have seen a trend developing whereby almost every plaintiff filing a personal injury lawsuit in such cases claims they suffer from PTSD as a consequence of the alleged injury, without regard for any other potential causes or their own overall life experience.  As a result, most plaintiffs seek emotional distress damages for PTSD as an element of damages in their personal injury lawsuits.

This being the case, there is no substitute for thorough preparation, in-depth knowledge of the material, and the ability to translate “psycho-speak” into plain language in order to mount an effective cross examination.  This preparation should start with a rigorous study of the DSM-5.

Effectively Challenging Plaintiff’s Allegation of PTSD Can Significantly Reduce or Eliminate Plaintiff’s Claim For Emotional Distress Damages

Most plaintiff and defense attorneys would likely admit that handling PTSD claims on behalf of their respective clients, and in particular, dealing effectively with forensic psychological experts, is difficult.  In defending a personal injury action where PTSD is claimed, it is essential that defense counsel have a thorough understanding of the interaction between the DSM-5, standardized testing, how the testing was scored, whether the tests administered had validity scales, and what other personal historical factors and information the plaintiff’s examining physician had available to him or her.

It is also important to determine whether the plaintiff’s experts considered any other mental disease or defect, and, if so, how they reached their differential diagnosis of PTSD.  All of this is necessary for thoroughly cross-examining plaintiff’s experts and challenging misdiagnosed claims of PTSD.

There is no single test that will clinically establish the presence of PTSD.  Typically, tests such as the MMPI, the TSI, or other standardized tests are administered.  Defense counsel should know whether there are validity scales and what they show, and they should be prepared to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert on these issues.  Defense counsel should cross-examine plaintiff’s expert on his or her knowledge of recent longitudinal studies done on PTSD, many of which are authored or co-authored by members of the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR PTSD Work Group or other Task Force or advisors.

Other fertile strategies for cross-examination include probing the extent of the expert’s clinical experience, how they applied clinical judgment to reach the diagnosis, how they accounted for malingering, and extensive questioning regarding key diagnostic criteria such as “life-threatening” and “persistence.”

Essential Diagnostic Features of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) 

“The essential feature of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to one or more traumatic events.  Emotional reactions to the traumatic event (e.g., fear, helplessness, horror) are no longer a part of Criterion A.  The clinical presentation of PTSD varies.  In some individuals, fear-based re-experiencing, emotional, and behavioral symptoms may predominate.  In others, anhedonic or dysphoric mood states and negative cognitions may be most distressing.  In other individuals, arousal and reactive-externalizing symptoms are prominent, while in others, dissociative symptoms predominate.  Finally, some individuals exhibit combinations of these symptom patterns.”  DSM-5 at p. 274.

The directly experienced traumatic events in Criterion A include, but are not limited to, exposure to war as a combatant or civilian, threatened or actual physical assault (e.g., physical attack, robbery, mugging, childhood physical abuse), threatened or actual sexual violence (e.g., forced sexual penetration, alcohol/drug-facilitated sexual penetration, abusive sexual contact, noncontact sexual abuse, sexual trafficking), being kidnapped, taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war, natural or human-made disasters, and severe motor vehicle accidents.

For children, sexually violent events may include developmentally inappropriate sexual experiences without violence or injury.  A life-threatening illness or debilitating medical condition is not necessarily considered a traumatic event.  Medical incidents that qualify as traumatic events involve sudden, catastrophic events (e.g., waking during surgery, anaphylactic shock).  Witnessed events include, but are not limited to, observing threatened or serious injury, unnatural death, physical or sexual abuse of another person due to violent assault, domestic violence, accident, war or disaster, or a medical catastrophe in one’s child (e.g., a life-threatening hemorrhage).  Indirect exposure through learning about an event is limited to experiences affecting close relatives or friends and experiences that are violent or accidental (e.g., death due to natural causes does not qualify).  Such events include violent personal assault, suicide, serious accident, and serious injury.  The disorder may be especially severe or long-lasting when the stressor is interpersonal and intentional (e.g., torture, sexual violence).

The response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror.  In children, the response must involve disorganized or agitated behavior.  Characteristic symptoms include persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, persistence of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness and persistent symptoms of increased arousal.  The full symptom picture must be present for more than one month and the disturbance must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

An individual will have persistent symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal not present before the trauma.  These symptoms can include difficulty falling or staying asleep that may be due to recurrent nightmares during which the traumatic event is relived.  Other symptoms can include hyper-vigilance and exaggerated startle response.  Some individuals report irritability, outbursts of anger, or difficulty concentrating or completing tasks.

Associated Descriptive Features and Mental Disorders 

Developmental regression, such as loss of language in young children, may occur.  Auditory pseudo-hallucinations, such as having the sensory experience of hearing one’s thoughts spoken in one or more different voices, as well as paranoid ideation, can be present.  Following prolonged repeated and severe traumatic events (e.g., childhood abuse or torture), the individual may additionally experience dissociative symptoms, difficulties in regulating emotions, and/or difficulties maintaining stable relationships.

When the traumatic event produces violent death, symptoms of both problematic bereavement and PTSD may be present.  Part of the difficulty in accurately diagnosing PTSD is that it is associated with many other anxiety and mental disorders.  For example, PTSD is also associated with increased rates of Major Depressive Disorder, Substance-Related Disorders, Panic disorder, Agoraphobia, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social Phobia, Specific Phobia, and Bipolar Disorder.  These disorders can precede, follow, or emerge concurrently with the onset of PTSD.

PTSD Prevalence Rates

In the United States, projected lifetime risk for PTSD using DSM-IV criteria at age 75 years is 8.7%.  Twelve-month prevalence among U.S. adults is about 3.5%.  Lower estimates of 0.5%-1.0% are seen in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.  The DSM-IV discusses community-based studies that reveal a lifetime prevalence for PTSD of approximately 8% of the adult population in the United States.  Information about general prevalence rates in other countries is not available.   Studies of at-risk individuals yield variable findings, with the highest rates (ranging between one-third and more than half of those exposed) found among survivors of rape, military combat and captivity, and ethnically or politically motivated internment and genocide.

Differential Diagnosis

PTSD can occur at any age, beginning after the first year of life.  Symptoms usually begin within the first three months following the trauma, although there may be a delay of months, or even years, before criteria for the diagnosis are met.  There is abundant evidence for what DSM-IV called “delayed onset” but is now called “delayed expression,” with the recognition that some symptoms typically appear immediately and that the delay is in meeting the full criteria.

The DSM-5 emphasizes that with PTSD, the stressor must be of an extreme, (i.e., “life-threatening) nature.  In contrast, other mental disorders often mistakenly diagnosed as PTSD include Adjustment Disorder, where the stressor can be of any severity.  The test also points out that not all psychopathology that occurs in individuals exposed to an extreme stressor should necessarily be attributed to PTSD and may be the result of many other mental disorders.  Mentioned are Acute Stress Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Schizophrenia, and other psychotic disorders or mood disorders with psychotic features.  Although a discussion of all diagnostic criteria is beyond the scope of this article, virtually each of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD emphasize that persistence of the symptoms, the re-experiencing of the event, and the avoidance of associated stimuli is essential.

Conclusion

Scott Brooksby recently cross examined a plaintiff’s forensic psychologist in a high-exposure personal injury case he was defending.  Plaintiff’s expert typically diagnosed more than half of those he evaluated with PTSD.  On cross-examination, this expert was not familiar with the prevalence rates, the specific criteria, or the comorbidity issues associated with PTSD and published in the DSM.  Most significantly, he could not describe the single most important feature for a diagnosis of PTSD: a “characteristic set of symptoms following exposure to one or more traumatic events.”  Instead, the expert merely opined that, in so many words, plaintiff was unhappy, withdrawn, and appeared to be troubled by a series of events.  The expert could not describe the relative significance of the plaintiff’s life events or link them to the specific criteria needed to achieve an accurate PTSD diagnosis.

It is important that the cross-examination specifically pin down the basis for the expert’s diagnosis, especially now with the much more detailed DSM-5, and the breaking up of many of the negative cognition clusters and a much more specific list of negative experience categories.

Even a comprehensive summary of the methodology for most effectively questioning or challenging a plaintiff’s claim of PTSD is beyond the scope of this blog post.  However, when cross-examining plaintiff’s expert witness regarding a PTSD diagnosis, defense counsel should always keep in mind that the plain text of the DSM-5, and examples of the trauma and criteria typically associated with PTSD, can often be easily contrasted with the data to disprove or cast doubt on the PTSD diagnosis.

Evaluation of Potential Claims: Direct Negligence and Vicarious Liability

Oregon Negligence Law Changed Significantly in 1987

Oregon is a state that recognizes a cause of action for direct negligence and vicarious liability.  The lawyers at OlsonBrooksby frequently defend catastrophic personal injury, product liability, and aviation claims which contain causes of action based on direct negligence and vicarious liability.

First, we will discuss potential claims for direct negligence.  An understanding of negligence law in Oregon requires a brief discussion of pre- and post-1987 common law decisions.  Prior to 1987, Oregon generally held to a conventional approach to negligence cases, requiring the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.  However, as a result of cases decided in the period around 1987, common law negligence in Oregon now depends on whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.

A Direct Claim For Negligence Can  Exist With Or Without The Fazzolari Special Relationship

The change from the strict adherence to the traditional common law elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages was a result of the Oregon appellate court’s perceived overuse of the cliché “duty” or “no duty.”  Oregon courts, therefore, began to encourage juries and judges to decide each case on its own facts.  Duty continues to play an affirmative role when the parties invoke a particular status, relationship, or standard of conduct beyond the standards generated by common law.  This was the result of the so-called Fazzolari principle, which now governs negligence law in Oregon.  See Fazzolari v. Portland School District 1J, 303 Or 1 (1987).

A special relationship is usually defined in the form of a fiduciary, contractual, or legal relationship such as guardianship.  Typically, the school–student relationship has been deemed a special relationship as contemplated by Fazzolari.

Fazzolari typically requires a three-part test:

  1. Determine whether a particular status, relationship, or standard exists;
  2. If so, analyze that status, relationship, or standard to determine whether a “duty” beyond that of ordinary care exists;
  3. If such a standard, relationship, or status is not alleged, then analyze the case under principles of general negligence based on foreseeability of risk of harm.

For example, suppose an employee of a sports club is involved in an accident in which a club member is injured.  Although there are no Oregon cases exactly on point, given the nature of the relationship between the employee and the club member, we do not believe that the member has a strong argument that a “special relationship” existed between himself and the sports club.

Let’s suppose further that the paperwork which was executed by the member consisted of the membership application and the general waiver of liability for use of the sports center facilities.  Suppose there were no detailed contractual provisions denoting certain services, obligations, or protections provided to, or expected of, the member.  Therefore, there was no fiduciary relationship.  Under these facts, a special relationship did not exist between the member and the sports club that typically would have invoked a duty of care to the member beyond that of the ordinary care extended to a business invitee.

Although courts have often found that schools are in a special relationship with their students, we do not believe that type of relationship is comparable to the sports club and its member.  This is because of the fundamentally voluntary nature of the sports club membership (without regard to the statutory abolition of assumption of the risk discussed below).  Moreover, we should assume that the sports club member was not a third-party beneficiary of any contract that existed between the sports club and a government agency or other third party.

For these reasons, we see nothing that would clearly take this hypothetical case out of the conventional principles of negligence and create a special relationship requiring examination on its own facts.

Although a special relationship may take a case out of the typical “duty” or “no duty” scenario, the harm to the protected interest of the putative plaintiff must still be reasonably foreseeable.  Therefore, given that, in this hypothetical “sports club / member” relationship scenario, we are operating under the principles of ordinary negligence, the appropriate standard in this case is that an organization’s conduct must not unreasonably create a foreseeable risk of harm to others.

Direct negligence claims are sometimes referred to as causes of action based on negligent hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, or negligent retention.  The organization may be directly liable for negligence claims based on hiring, retention, supervision, or training if (1) it places a dangerous person in a position that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and if (2) the organization knew of the danger or could have discovered the danger through reasonable investigation.

In the event there were other facts such as the following, it may support one or more of the sports club member’s claims for direct negligence:

  • Sports club failed to screen employees, including those that may have needed specialized training, i.e., lifeguards.
  • There is no documentation that sports club ever trained its employees, let alone the employee or employees who were involved with member’s hypothetical accident.
  • Employees displayed an attitude of disinterest, which may have affected their performance of safety related duties.
  • Sports club failed to maintain adequate documentation of employee performance in employee personnel files.
  • Employees had ambiguous or uncertain understanding of the proper safety protocol.
  • Sports club has a history of failing to comply with its own club procedures, resulting in similar prior injuries.
  • Sports club employee(s) admitted they were lazy, did not like their jobs, or were apathetic toward proper performance.
  • Sports club failed to develop adequate safety procedures, i.e., requiring employees or members to obtain and renew any type of skill or safety certification.
  • Sports club employee was not properly supervised, lacked familiarity with sports clubs rules and procedures, and was less experienced at a given task, i.e., weight training safety spotting, than many of the members.

In summary, if sufficient evidence exists of the sports club’s failure to properly hire, train, or supervise, or retain, the club would have an uphill battle defending against a direct negligence claim. 

Vicarious Liability 

Oregon is a vicarious liability state.  If, as in the example above, the sports club member made a claim that the sports club is vicariously liable for his alleged injury, he would argue that sports club, as the “master” of its employee or “servant,” is liable for its employee’s negligence in failing to protect what was a foreseeable interest in the kind of harm that befell the member.  Specifically, the member would allege that, due to the employee’s negligence in failing to supervise, the member was not properly protected from the injury of the type that befell him, and that the accident was foreseeable and preventable.  The employee must have been acting within the course and scope of his employment and have been motivated, in part, to serve the interests of the “master,” i.e., the sports club.

In a claim for vicarious liability, as discussed in more detail below, the sports club need not have played any role in the negligence itself, so long as it controls the actions of the negligent employee and the employee’s actions were performed within the course and scope of employment and performed, at least in part, to benefit the employer.

Regarding course and scope, an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment if three factors are present:

  1. The employee’s actions at the time of the accident substantially occurred within the time and space limits authorized by the employment;
  2. The employee was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer;
  3. The act is of a kind that the employee was hired to perform.

Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or 439, 442 (1988).

All three factors must be present for vicariously liability to withstand a challenge.

In vicarious liability cases, the best defense is that the employee committed an intentional act that fell outside the course and scope of his employment.  Nearly all the published cases where courts have held that the employee was acting outside the course and scope involve intentional acts of force committed by security guards, bouncers, bodyguards, etc.

Foreseeability Issues

Reasonable foreseeability is still a necessary aspect of negligence, in any form.  In the example above, where a sports club member is injured, depending on the nature of the injury, the sports club would need to consider the specific facts that gave rise to the claim and whether or not a jury would conclude that the injury was reasonably foreseeable.  From a defense perspective, arguing that reasonable foreseeability does not exist is an uphill battle in most cases.  Oregon law generally finds that an intervening act negates fault only in extreme cases, such as those involving criminals.  For example, in one of the seminal Oregon foreseeability cases, Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Division, 316 Or 499 (1993), an en banc decision, a prisoner on a work crew stole the prison van in which the guard had left the keys, drove to his mother’s home, stole a firearm, and later used it to kill someone in the van.  316 Or at 502.

The court noted that, while the defendant had a history of temper problems, there was nothing in his background that would ever suggest he would commit such a crime.  Id. at 507.  The court ultimately held that an intervening criminal instrumentality caused the harm and created the risk Id. at 510-11.  The court explained that, although “it is generally foreseeable that criminals may commit crimes and that prisoners may escape and engage in criminal activity while at large, that level of foreseeability does not make the criminal’s acts the legal responsibility of everyone who may have contributed in some way to the criminal opportunity.”  Id. at 511.

Conclusion

Product liability, catastrophic personal injury, and aviation claims, all of which Olson Brooksby frequently defend, require a clear understanding of which claims contain causes of action based on direct negligence and vicarious liability, and more importantly, what the elements are, so that proper defenses can be raised, and an investigation and discovery plan can be drafted, to attempt to defeat the claims.

Why Are There So Many Helicopter-Related Air Medical Operations Accidents?

Helicopter Air Medical Operations Accidents are relatively high when compared to 14 C.F.R.§ 121 (Part 121) accidents.  According to the NTSB, which is charged with investigating every aviation accident in the United States and many abroad, there were no fatalities in any Part 121 accidents in 2010.  This despite some 17.5 million flight hours.  Of those Part 121 accidents, the most common defining event, accounting for 26% of such accidents in 2010, was a turbulence encounter.  The remaining defining events for Part 121 accidents in 2010, just as they generally have been for the last 10 years, involved ground collisions, ground handling, runway incursion, cabin safety, system failure, and bird strikes etc., many or most of which are ground events.  Less than half of Part 121 accidents happened en route, although a significant number occurred during takeoff or landing.

Part 121 flights, as opposed to HEMS flights under Part 135 or Part 91, have distinctly different flight altitudes, flight durations, weather events, cruise speeds, air frame, and power plant configurations and thrust capacities.  No one, including the NTSB, suggests that the high number of turbulence-related incidents involved in Part 121 operations should also characterize helicopter flight generally, particularly Helicopter Emergency Services (“HEMS”) flight.  There is no evidence that turbulence, as understood in the context of Part 121 statistical treatment of accidents, has played any significant causal role in the relatively high number of HEMS mishaps, whether they resulted in injuries/fatalities or not.  Given the incredibly low statistical number of injury/fatality mishaps in Part 121 operations compared to the high incidences of injury/fatality HEMS mishaps, what, if any, conclusions can be drawn?

Air medical operations are conducted under both Part 135 and Part 91, depending on whether patients are being carried on board the aircraft.  HEMS missions en route to pick up patients or organs, or to reposition aircraft after accomplishing patient transport operations, are generally conducted under Part 91.  Trips transporting patients or organs to medical facilities are conducted under Part 135.  Some air medical helicopter operations, particularly for emergency medical services, are conducted by state or local government entities as public use flights, whether patients are on board or not.

Although fixed-wing aircraft are also used for Part 91 and Part 135 medical missions, there were only 10 fixed wing fatalities in air medical operations during the entire decade between 2000 and 2009.

A Statistical Overview of HEMS Accident Frequency and Type

HEMS accounted for about 80 percent of all air medical accidents during the ten-year period 2001-2010.  Against this backdrop, we examine HEMS accidents, of which there were 13 in 2010 alone, seven of them fatal, according to a 2012 NTSB report. Six of the seven HEMS fatalities in 2010 involved operations under Part 91.  From 2000 through 2010 (the most recent year NTSB statistics are available), 33 percent of HEMS accidents were fatal.  Most HEMS accidents occurred during airborne phases of flight, and during 2010, all HEMS fatalities occurred during airborne phases of flight.

Obviously, this is explained in part by the fact that unlike fixed-wing air medical operations, HEMS flights generally do not operate out of established aerodromes.  Instead, they operate out of off-airport locations where patients are in need of timely, critical care.  According to a 2011 NTSB report, in every year except 2007, the number of Part 91 air medical helicopter accidents without patients aboard have been significantly higher than in any other category of air medical flying.

It may be useful to break down the 31 accidents involving thirty-two helicopters in air medical operations between 2007-2009.  Eighteen were being operated under Part 91, thirteen were conducted under Part 135, and one was conducted as a public use flight.  Eleven of the accidents, involving twelve helicopters, were fatal.  Collision with objects on takeoff or landing accounted for 7 of the 31 accidents, but no fatalities.

On the other hand, four of the five controlled flight into terrain accidents were fatal, including the crash of the Maryland State Police public use flight carrying accident victims on approach to Andrews Air Force Base.  Two of the three loss of control in-flight accidents were fatal, as were two of the three unintended flights into instrument meteorological conditions accidents.  The midair collision between two HEMS helicopters conducting Part 135 operations in Flagstaff, Arizona, in June 2008 was also fatal to everyone on board.  The other two fatalities involving a non-power plant system were coded as “other”, according to a 2011 NTSB report.  

What Are The Typical Causes 

In any aviation operation, pilot training, experience, and judgment are some of the most important factors in safe flight.  With helicopter operations generally, and particularly HEMS operations, those factors are even more critical because of the conditions they fly in, such as bad weather, night flying, or flying in rural areas where wires or other low strike points may not be lighted or marked, and air-traffic may be uncontrolled.  HEMS operations also face an unparalleled need for speed to save lives.  Review of individual NTSB probable cause reports, NTSB factual data, and other aviation industry data would tend to suggest that helicopter accidents and resulting serious injuries and fatalities are most often the consequence of a number of factors, including loss of control, visibility issues, wire strikes, system component failure, or post-impact fire.

Although some of these issues pose dangers during Part 121 operations, they simply do not pose the same risks, largely due to obvious differences in the nature of the aviation operation, the equipment, altitude, avionics, take-off and landings from tightly controlled air-space, and the use of aerodromes.  In addition, HEMS operations often involve situations in which minutes may literally save life and limb, prompting hurried behavior.  While that is not to suggest that HEMS pilots are not some of the best helicopter pilots flying, they do face particular challenges, to which Part 121 pilots or even fixed-wing air medical operations pilots are less exposed.

There are also tremendous variations in helicopter air medical pilot training.  From 2007-2009, for example, NTSB data suggest that the accident helicopter pilots’ median age was 54, ranging from 35 to 69.  Median total flight hours were 7,125 with a range from 2,685 to 18,000.  The median time in the type of accident helicopter was 375 hours, ranging from 11 to 4,241.  NTSB statistics from 2011 suggest that such variations in flight time and the corollary impact on experience and judgment may be significant factors in the number of crashes. HEMS operations more often than not must use unimproved landing sites at accident scenes and helipads and hospitals or medical facilities.  Loss of control in flight was the most common event for both fatal and non-fatal helicopter crashes, followed by collisions on takeoff or landing and system component failure of the power plant.

Even though HEMS pilots may have thousands of flight hours and are unquestionably some of the best helicopter pilots in the world, owners and operators of HEMS facilities should continuously examine and emphasize the consistent causes of HEMS crashes and adapt training programs to focus on those causes.

Olson Brooksby has an active aviation accident and aviation component product liability defense practice.  For more information, please contact our office.