Tag Archives: Product liability

Aviation, DSM-5, Evidence, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Trials, Uncategorized

Key Changes to the DSM-5 for the Product Liability, Personal Injury, and Aviation Defense Lawyer

DSM-5 book

The creation of the fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was a massive undertaking that involved hundreds of psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians, and other medical professionals working together over a 12-year period.  The DSM-5, which replaced the 2000 DSM-IV (TR), is the foundation for reliable diagnosis and treatment of psychological and mental disorders.  As with prior DSM publications, which now date back decades, it is not intended to be a substitute for sound, objective clinical judgment, training, and skill.

Reflecting and prompted by the many new longitudinal studies, research papers, and experimental treatment modalities that have appeared since 2000, this new DSM edition contains significant changes in the classification of some disorders, and the removal or addition of other disorders.  This discussion will provide a brief overview of some of the key changes to the DSM-V and will touch on issues of interest to legal professionals working in the areas of product liability, personal injury, and aviation defense.

In a trial setting, familiarity with the DSM-5 and the underlying literature will be critical to an effective cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert.  Often, with forensic psychologists, the defense can make significant inroads on the basis that plaintiff’s expert is not sufficiently familiar with the DSM or associated literature.  For example, a significant new body of literature related to “resiliency and benefit realization” after a traumatic experience is largely unknown to most plaintiffs’ forensic psychologists.

A substantial percentage of high exposure cases in those categories involve a diagnosis of PTSD by plaintiff’s expert and a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score based on the five-level multiaxial system, with Axis 5 providing the GAF score.  This brief post will focus on the changes to ­– or more accurately, the elimination of – the multiaxial system, as well as the changes to the criteria, symptoms, and diagnosis of PTSD.

A subsequent post will deal specifically with the criteria for PTSD and will include suggestions for cross-examination of plaintiff’s diagnosing mental health professional.

Changes to the Multiaxial System in DSM-5

Despite its widespread use, particularly among some insurance agencies and the government, the multiaxial system in DSM-IV was not required to make a mental disorder diagnosis.  DSM-5 has moved to a nonaxial diagnostic model (formerly AXES I, II, and III), with separate notations for important psychosocial and contextual factors (formerly Axis IV) and disability (formerly Axis V).  The approach of distinguishing diagnosis from psychosocial and contextual factors is also consistent with established WHO and ICD guidelines, which consider the individual’s functional status separately from his or her diagnosis or symptom status.

DSM-IV Axis V consisted of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale, representing the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of “functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.”  It was recommended that the GAF be dropped from DSM-5 for a number of reasons, including its conceptual lack of clarity (e.g., including symptoms, suicide risk, and disabilities in the descriptors) and questionable psychometrics in routine practice.  In order to provide a global measure of disability, the WHO Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS) is included in DSM-5 for further study.

Changes to PTSD in DSM-5

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) is a Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder.  DSM-5 criteria for PTSD differ significantly from the DSM-IV.  The stressor criterion (Criterion A) is more explicit with regard to events that qualify as “traumatic” experiences.  Also, DSM-IV Criterion A2 (subjective reaction) has been eliminated.

Whereas there were three major symptom clusters in DSM-IV – re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and arousal – there are now four symptom clusters in DSM-5 because the avoidance/numbing cluster is divided into two distinct clusters: avoidance and persistent negative alterations in cognitions and mood.  The latter category, which retains most of the DSM-IV numbing symptoms, also includes new or re-conceptualized symptoms such as persistent negative emotional states.  The final cluster – alterations in arousal and reactivity – retains most of the DSM-IV arousal symptoms.  It also includes angry outbursts and reckless or self-destructive behavior.

PTSD is now developmentally sensitive in that diagnostic thresholds have been lowered for children and adolescents.  Furthermore, separate criteria have been added for children age 6 years or younger with this disorder.

The DSM-IV childhood diagnosis of reactive attachment disorder had two subtypes: emotionally withdrawn/inhibited and indiscriminately social/disinhibited.  In DSM-5, these subtypes are defined as distinct disorders: “reactive attachment disorder” and “disinhibited social engagement disorder.”

Olson Brooksby is a product liability, personal injury, and aviation defense firm.

Negligence, Oregon Law, Uncategorized

Evaluation of Potential Claims: Direct Negligence and Vicarious Liability

Oregon Negligence Law Changed Significantly in 1987

Oregon is a state that recognizes a cause of action for direct negligence and vicarious liability.  The lawyers at OlsonBrooksby frequently defend catastrophic personal injury, product liability, and aviation claims which contain causes of action based on direct negligence and vicarious liability.

First, we will discuss potential claims for direct negligence.  An understanding of negligence law in Oregon requires a brief discussion of pre- and post-1987 common law decisions.  Prior to 1987, Oregon generally held to a conventional approach to negligence cases, requiring the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.  However, as a result of cases decided in the period around 1987, common law negligence in Oregon now depends on whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.

A Direct Claim For Negligence Can  Exist With Or Without The Fazzolari Special Relationship

The change from the strict adherence to the traditional common law elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages was a result of the Oregon appellate court’s perceived overuse of the cliché “duty” or “no duty.”  Oregon courts, therefore, began to encourage juries and judges to decide each case on its own facts.  Duty continues to play an affirmative role when the parties invoke a particular status, relationship, or standard of conduct beyond the standards generated by common law.  This was the result of the so-called Fazzolari principle, which now governs negligence law in Oregon.  See Fazzolari v. Portland School District 1J, 303 Or 1 (1987).

A special relationship is usually defined in the form of a fiduciary, contractual, or legal relationship such as guardianship.  Typically, the school–student relationship has been deemed a special relationship as contemplated by Fazzolari.

Fazzolari typically requires a three-part test:

  1. Determine whether a particular status, relationship, or standard exists;
  2. If so, analyze that status, relationship, or standard to determine whether a “duty” beyond that of ordinary care exists;
  3. If such a standard, relationship, or status is not alleged, then analyze the case under principles of general negligence based on foreseeability of risk of harm.

For example, suppose an employee of a sports club is involved in an accident in which a club member is injured.  Although there are no Oregon cases exactly on point, given the nature of the relationship between the employee and the club member, we do not believe that the member has a strong argument that a “special relationship” existed between himself and the sports club.

Let’s suppose further that the paperwork which was executed by the member consisted of the membership application and the general waiver of liability for use of the sports center facilities.  Suppose there were no detailed contractual provisions denoting certain services, obligations, or protections provided to, or expected of, the member.  Therefore, there was no fiduciary relationship.  Under these facts, a special relationship did not exist between the member and the sports club that typically would have invoked a duty of care to the member beyond that of the ordinary care extended to a business invitee.

Although courts have often found that schools are in a special relationship with their students, we do not believe that type of relationship is comparable to the sports club and its member.  This is because of the fundamentally voluntary nature of the sports club membership (without regard to the statutory abolition of assumption of the risk discussed below).  Moreover, we should assume that the sports club member was not a third-party beneficiary of any contract that existed between the sports club and a government agency or other third party.

For these reasons, we see nothing that would clearly take this hypothetical case out of the conventional principles of negligence and create a special relationship requiring examination on its own facts.

Although a special relationship may take a case out of the typical “duty” or “no duty” scenario, the harm to the protected interest of the putative plaintiff must still be reasonably foreseeable.  Therefore, given that, in this hypothetical “sports club / member” relationship scenario, we are operating under the principles of ordinary negligence, the appropriate standard in this case is that an organization’s conduct must not unreasonably create a foreseeable risk of harm to others.

Direct negligence claims are sometimes referred to as causes of action based on negligent hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, or negligent retention.  The organization may be directly liable for negligence claims based on hiring, retention, supervision, or training if (1) it places a dangerous person in a position that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and if (2) the organization knew of the danger or could have discovered the danger through reasonable investigation.

In the event there were other facts such as the following, it may support one or more of the sports club member’s claims for direct negligence:

  • Sports club failed to screen employees, including those that may have needed specialized training, i.e., lifeguards.
  • There is no documentation that sports club ever trained its employees, let alone the employee or employees who were involved with member’s hypothetical accident.
  • Employees displayed an attitude of disinterest, which may have affected their performance of safety related duties.
  • Sports club failed to maintain adequate documentation of employee performance in employee personnel files.
  • Employees had ambiguous or uncertain understanding of the proper safety protocol.
  • Sports club has a history of failing to comply with its own club procedures, resulting in similar prior injuries.
  • Sports club employee(s) admitted they were lazy, did not like their jobs, or were apathetic toward proper performance.
  • Sports club failed to develop adequate safety procedures, i.e., requiring employees or members to obtain and renew any type of skill or safety certification.
  • Sports club employee was not properly supervised, lacked familiarity with sports clubs rules and procedures, and was less experienced at a given task, i.e., weight training safety spotting, than many of the members.

In summary, if sufficient evidence exists of the sports club’s failure to properly hire, train, or supervise, or retain, the club would have an uphill battle defending against a direct negligence claim. 

Vicarious Liability 

Oregon is a vicarious liability state.  If, as in the example above, the sports club member made a claim that the sports club is vicariously liable for his alleged injury, he would argue that sports club, as the “master” of its employee or “servant,” is liable for its employee’s negligence in failing to protect what was a foreseeable interest in the kind of harm that befell the member.  Specifically, the member would allege that, due to the employee’s negligence in failing to supervise, the member was not properly protected from the injury of the type that befell him, and that the accident was foreseeable and preventable.  The employee must have been acting within the course and scope of his employment and have been motivated, in part, to serve the interests of the “master,” i.e., the sports club.

In a claim for vicarious liability, as discussed in more detail below, the sports club need not have played any role in the negligence itself, so long as it controls the actions of the negligent employee and the employee’s actions were performed within the course and scope of employment and performed, at least in part, to benefit the employer.

Regarding course and scope, an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment if three factors are present:

  1. The employee’s actions at the time of the accident substantially occurred within the time and space limits authorized by the employment;
  2. The employee was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer;
  3. The act is of a kind that the employee was hired to perform.

Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or 439, 442 (1988).

All three factors must be present for vicariously liability to withstand a challenge.

In vicarious liability cases, the best defense is that the employee committed an intentional act that fell outside the course and scope of his employment.  Nearly all the published cases where courts have held that the employee was acting outside the course and scope involve intentional acts of force committed by security guards, bouncers, bodyguards, etc.

Foreseeability Issues

Reasonable foreseeability is still a necessary aspect of negligence, in any form.  In the example above, where a sports club member is injured, depending on the nature of the injury, the sports club would need to consider the specific facts that gave rise to the claim and whether or not a jury would conclude that the injury was reasonably foreseeable.  From a defense perspective, arguing that reasonable foreseeability does not exist is an uphill battle in most cases.  Oregon law generally finds that an intervening act negates fault only in extreme cases, such as those involving criminals.  For example, in one of the seminal Oregon foreseeability cases, Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Division, 316 Or 499 (1993), an en banc decision, a prisoner on a work crew stole the prison van in which the guard had left the keys, drove to his mother’s home, stole a firearm, and later used it to kill someone in the van.  316 Or at 502.

The court noted that, while the defendant had a history of temper problems, there was nothing in his background that would ever suggest he would commit such a crime.  Id. at 507.  The court ultimately held that an intervening criminal instrumentality caused the harm and created the risk.  Id. at 510-11.  The court explained that, although “it is generally foreseeable that criminals may commit crimes and that prisoners may escape and engage in criminal activity while at large, that level of foreseeability does not make the criminal’s acts the legal responsibility of everyone who may have contributed in some way to the criminal opportunity.”  Id. at 511.

Conclusion

Product liability, catastrophic personal injury, and aviation claims, all of which Olson Brooksby frequently defend, require a clear understanding of which claims contain causes of action based on direct negligence and vicarious liability, and more importantly, what the elements are, so that proper defenses can be raised, and an investigation and discovery plan can be drafted, to attempt to defeat the claims.

DSM-5

Hoarding and its relation to fire, product liability, and personal injury cases

Tech room

Olson Brooksby regularly handles the defense in product liability and high-exposure negligence cases.  The purpose of this article is to make other defense firms aware of the new stand-alone designation for Hoarding presented in the latest (Fifth) version of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V).

As we mentioned in a previous blog post, the new DSM-V, which was published in May, 2013, includes “Hoarding Disorder” (often abbreviated “HD” in the literature) as a stand-alone mental disorder for the first time in the history of the APA’s DSM publication.  Although HD had been discussed in earlier versions of the DSM as an aspect of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), it did not provide anywhere near the detail of diagnostic criteria that the DSM-V provides.  Moreover, recent studies show that hoarding and OCD are not as similar as previously thought.

The new hoarding diagnosis could have important implications in the product liability defense context.  Some studies suggest that as many as six percent of all house fires are the direct result of hoarding.  With any product producing a heat source sufficient to cause a fire if used improperly, placing combustible materials in sufficient quantity, or sufficient proximity, to the ignition source has the potential to cause a fire.  This is often the scenario with fires involving hoarding behavior.

Will a hoarding diagnosis provide the product manufacturer a defense, based on misuse of the product, and thereby dispose a jury to allocate a significant percentage of comparative fault to a diagnosed hoarder?  Or will jurors be more inclined to sympathize with, or overlook, the hoarding behavior and be lenient in the assignment of comparative fault to the hoarder?  Since the hoarding diagnosis is new, this remains to be seen.

The Basic DSM-V Diagnostic Criteria

The basic criteria for a diagnosis of hoarding include:

  1.  Persistent difficulty discarding or parting with possessions, regardless of their actual value.
  2. This difficulty is due to a perceived need to save the items and to the distress associated with discarding them.
  3. The difficulty discarding possessions results in the accumulation of possessions that congest and clutter active living areas and substantially compromise their intended use.  If living areas are uncluttered, it is only because of the interventions of third parties (e.g., family members, cleaners, authorities).
  4. The hoarding causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (including maintaining a safe environment for self and others).
  5. The hoarding is not better explained by the symptoms of another mental disorder (e.g., obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disorder, decreased energy in major depressive disorder, delusions in schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, cognitive deficits in major neurocognitive disorder, or restricted interests in autism spectrum disorder).

The Essential Diagnostic Features

A complete treatment of the diagnostic features of this newly categorized stand-alone mental disorder is beyond the scope of this article.  The essential feature of hoarding disorder is “persistent difficulties discarding or parting with possessions, regardless of their actual value.”  (Criterion A).  The word persistent indicates a long-standing difficulty rather than more transient life circumstances that may lead to excessive clutter, such as inheriting property.  The difficulty in discarding possessions noted in Criterion A refers to any form of discarding, including throwing away, selling, giving away, or recycling.  The main reasons given for these difficulties are the perceived utility or aesthetic value of the items or strong sentimental attachment to the possessions.  Some individuals feel responsible for the fate of their possessions and often go to great lengths to avoid being wasteful.

Specifiers

Approximately 80%-90% of individuals with hoarding disorder display excessive acquisition features.  The most frequent form of acquisition is excessive buying, followed by acquisition of free items (e.g., leaflets, items discarded by others).  Stealing is not common.  Some individuals may deny excessive acquisition when first assessed, but this symptomology may appear later during the course of treatment.  Individuals with hoarding disorder typically experience distress if they are unable to, or are prevented from, acquiring items.

Prevalence, Development and Course

Nationally representative prevalence studies of hoarding disorder are not available.  Community surveys estimate the point prevalence of clinically significant hoarding in the United States and Europe to be approximately 2% – 6%, or roughly between 6 and 15 million Americans.  Hoarding symptoms may first emerge between the ages of 11 and 15, start interfering with the individual’s function by the mid-20s, and cause clinically significant impairment by the mid-30s.  Most participants in clinical studies are in their 50s, with the severity increasing with each decade of life.  Hoarding symptoms appear to be almost three times more prevalent in older adults (ages 55 – 94 years) compared with younger adults (ages 34 – 44 years).  Most study participants report the disorder symptoms a nearly constant presence, and not episodic.

Pathological hoarding in children is easily distinguishable from developmentally saving and collecting behaviors.  Hoarding behavior is familial, with about 50% of individuals who hoard reporting having a relative who also hoards.  Twin studies indicate that approximately 50% of the variability in hoarding behavior is attributable to additive genetic factors.  Approximately 75 metropolitan communities in the United States have task forces to address this disorder.

Hoarding Disorder AS Distinct From Obsessive Compulsive Disorder

When defending a product liability case that resulted in a fire, it will be important to understand the new research distinguishing hoarding from OCD.  A new study, authored by Dr. David Tolin in the Journal of the American Medical Association, shows that patients with hoarding disorder exhibit different brain activity during decision making than patients with OCD, pointing to a biological distinction.  Dr. Jeff Szymanski of the International OCD foundation reported that after the study, they concluded that a hoarder is not a pack rat, a slob, or lazy.  “A part of their brain doesn’t work the way your brain works.”

Dr. Tolin used brain imaging (fMRI) to test how 107 people reacted when asked whether they wanted to keep a piece of junk mail or discard it.  Sometimes it was junk mail that belonged to the patient, and sometimes it belonged to someone else.  Forty-three participants had hoarding disorder and another 31 had OCD, or obsessive compulsive disorder, according to the study.

When the junk mail had a hoarding patient’s name on it, certain parts of that patient’s brain lit up, showing “abnormal activity” in the decision-making regions (the anterior cingulated cortex and the insula), according to the study.  When the mail listed someone else’s name, the same parts of the hoarder’s brain were abnormally quiet.  According to Tolin, “only hoarding patients showed this kind of activity, and OCD patients did not.

Conclusion

Now that Hoarding Disorder (HD) is a distinct, APA sanctioned, mental disorder, it will likely have ramifications in product liability cases for both plaintiffs and defendants.  Given the relatively high number of fires, usually implicating a product, defense attorneys involved in product liability litigation will need to understand the disorder in those cases where HD is suspected.  Because jurors may tend to sympathize with hoarders, who are often characterized by their counsel as suffering from something akin to a mental handicap (thereby – erroneously – relieving them of any fault), the impact of HD may be greater on product liability defense counsel than on plaintiffs’ counsel.

Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Uncategorized

Punitive Damages

Initially Pleading the Claim for Punitive Damages is Not Permitted in Original Complaint

Punitive damages are permitted in Oregon in product liability actions. Under Oregon law, at the time of filing a pleading with the court, the pleading may not contain a request for an award of punitive damages. ORS 31.725. At any time after the pleading is filed, a party may move the court to allow the party to amend the pleading to assert a claim for punitive damages. The party making the motion may submit affidavits and documents in support of the claim and the party opposing may do the same. Punitive damages in Oregon are an element of damages, and do not constitute a separate claim for relief. Under Oregon law, insurance coverage for punitive damages is permitted.

The Standard for Pleading Punitive Damages

Oregon has a relatively low bar for the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs need only present “some evidence” of the conduct that may give rise to punitive damages. ORS 31.725(3)(a). The showing necessary for the amendment is equivalent to a prima facie case that would merely need to withstand a motion for directed verdict at the time the amendment is sought. We emphasize that this showing of “some evidence” is a low bar, particularly in Multnomah County Circuit Court. In most cases, when plaintiffs intend add a claim for punitive damages, they will expressly state in the initial complaint an intent to move to amend to do so.

In most counties in Oregon, punitive damages are generally not allowed in simple negligence cases. However, in Multnomah County Circuit Court, we have seen simple negligence cases where judges have allowed punitive damages to go to the jury.

The Clear and Convincing Standard and Evidence of Conduct Required at Trial

In order to actually obtain an award of punitive damages from the jury, as opposed to merely obtaining permission from the judge to request punitive damages in an amended complaint, Oregon law requires imposition of a clear and convincing standard. Punitive damages are not available unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages are sought has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others. ORS 31.730.

If a jury awards punitive damages, the court is required to review the award to determine whether the award is within the range of damages that a rational juror would be entitled to award based on the record as a whole, as well as statutory and common law factors. ORS 31.725 et. seq.

Statutory Allocation of Awards of Punitive Damages

With respect to the distribution of punitive damages, the percentages of the total award are all prescribed by statute. ORS 31.735. Under the statute, the State of Oregon takes 60% of every punitive damage award away from the plaintiff and puts it in the state crime victim’s fund. Then, plaintiff receives 30% and the attorney is paid an amount out of this 30%, but in no event more than 20% of the total punitive damages awarded. Finally, 10% is payable to the Oregon Attorney General for deposit in the State Court Facilities and Security Account. Plaintiff’s lawyers know this, so they often try to push harder to get the jury to award noneconomic damages. They may even decide to forego a punitive damages claim to avoid the risk of having a lower noneconomic damages award and a high punitive damages award that will go mostly to the state of Oregon. In cases with exposure to significant punitive damages, the Oregon Justice Department will often file a peremptory lien against the punitive damages to ensure proper distribution.

Damages Caps

There are no relevant damages caps on personal injury actions, as opposed to wrongful death actions. While Oregon case law has upheld a cap of $500,000 in noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has declined to impose such a cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases on the basis that a personal injury cause of action was recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the Oregon Constitution. In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the statutory cap on noneconomic damages because the wrongful death action is a creature of statute, and a cause of action that did not exist at the time of the ratification of the Oregon Constitution.

One important note about the noneconomic damages cap of $500,000: While the cap has now been upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in an en banc decision, this does not prevent the plaintiffs from pleading any amount they want to in the complaint. Under the statute, the jury is never told of the cap, and if the verdict for noneconomic damages exceeds the cap, it is the judge, not the jury, who reduces the verdict to $500,000 before entering the judgment. The judgment, rather than the verdict, is technically the document that has legal force. The entry of the judgment either starts the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal, or allows the plaintiff to execute on the judgment (collect either through voluntary payment or seizure of assets).

For example, let’s consider a hypothetical aviation crash. Suppose wife/mother is injured and her husband and son are killed. She could theoretically file a lawsuit demanding $50,000,000.00 in noneconomic damages for both her deceased son and husband. If the case went to trial under that scenario, and that amount was awarded, the judge, unbeknownst to the jury, and after the jury is excused from service, would reduce the verdicts in the two wrongful death cases to $500,000 each in noneconomic damages before entering the judgment.

Consumer products, Defective Products, Discovery, Evidence, Litigation, Oregon Law, Personal Injury, Prior Claims, Product Liability, Trials

Discovery and Admissiblity of Evidence of Prior Claims in Oregon Product Liability Cases

Olson Brooksby handles a wide variety of product liability cases involving products such as helicopter engines, heavy equipment, steel, toys, tools, household appliances and chemicals, paints, and solvents.  We frequently work with clients who have had prior claims involving allegedly defective products.  In product liability litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers almost always ask for documentation involving prior claims.  Usually, plaintiffs issue a broad request for documents regarding all prior incidents of any kind related to the model of product at issue or any version of that model.

The Standard for Discovery of Prior Claims

In Oregon, evidence regarding prior claims is generally discoverable.  ORCP 36 B(1).  In order for an opposing or other party to obtain discovery, the evidence should simply be relevant and reasonably likely to lead the discovery of admissible evidence.  Therefore, on a motion to compel, product liability defense counsel should expect that documentation concerning prior claims will be discoverable, particularly in cases concerning home appliances and other mechanical products.

An objection to a discovery request on the basis that the evidence may not be admissible at trial is not proper.  Oregon trial courts will allow discovery of evidence of prior claims if the products, conditions, or uses are merely “similar” as opposed to “identical.”

By way of a hypothetical example, suppose Large Bike Manufacturing Company manufactured a number of bikes during the past few months or years and the front rim of the tire was bending when bumps were hit that similar bikes were able to withstand.  Also suppose that a bicyclist was injured when the front rim on one of the bike models struck a speed bump even though the bicyclist was riding cautiously and reasonably.  On a motion to compel, most Oregon state court trial judges would order the production of all prior incidents of injury regarding other bike models with the same wheel, not just the model of bike that the bicyclist was riding.  The court would also likely order production of other claims of injury on all bikes, even if such injuries were caused by other mechanical failures.

The Standard for Admissibility of Prior Claims

The admissibility of evidence of other claims is governed by Oregon Evidence Code (“OEC”) 401, which defines relevant evidence; OEC 402, which provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible; and OEC 403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence in the event prejudice, confusion, or undue delay associated with the admission of the disputed evidence, in this case of prior claims, outweighs the probative value or helpfulness to the trier of fact.  Whether evidence of prior claims is discoverable and whether such evidence is admissible are two distinct issues.

With respect to the admissibility of evidence of prior claims, as opposed to the mere discovery of prior claims, OEC 401 generally provides that evidence of similar prior conduct, events, accidents, or even negligence, is generally held to be inadmissible to prove negligence or lack of negligence in the case being litigated.

However, evidence of prior similar acts, conduct, or events, which Oregon courts universally have ruled includes prior claims, is often held admissible to prove causation, danger, knowledge, intent, or the existence of a particular defect.  One of the seminal cases on this issue is Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 185 Or App 444 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 479 (2003).  Admissibility of the allegedly similar act will depend on whether prior conduct or events occurred under “similar conditions and circumstances,” although identical circumstances are not required.  Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 144 Or App 52, (1996), aff’d, 325 Or 438 (1997).

Whether the conditions and circumstances are substantially similar enough to allow admission of the evidence of prior claims is a decision for the court and will be reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard, which is a high standard.  As noted above, identical circumstances or an identical product is not necessary for admission of such evidence. Generally, unless there is clear prejudice, evidence of prior claims will be admissible.  The judge will usually comment that defense counsel is free to engage in cross-examination on the differences in the claims and argue that they go to the weight of the evidence.

In a product liability case, regardless of what the product may be, defense counsel should be prepared for a ruling that evidence of prior claims is discoverable.  Counsel should also be prepared for a ruling that evidence of prior claims is admissible.  Therefore, it may be advantageous to file a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior claims on the grounds that they are either dissimilar, or that there is insufficient information to even determine whether they are dissimilar.  The motion in limine should be filed before trial, so that even if the court admits evidence of prior claims, experts and witnesses can be prepared to address the prior claims in a way that minimizes any perceived wrongdoing.  Counsel should also consider the possibility that any product design changes may be considered “subsequent remedial measures” and should plan any motions in limine accordingly.

 

Consumer Expectation Test, Consumer products, CPSC, Defective Products, Failure to warn, Jury selection, Litigation, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Strict liability, Trials

The Single Test for Product Liability in Oregon

Olson Brooksby Has Extensive Experience With Product Liability Work in Oregon

Olson Brooksby defends product liability (including consumer products regulated by the CPSC such as lead toys and non-consumer products such as aircraft) and personal injury cases, with an emphasis on the defense of high exposure cases.

Both Kristin Olson and Scott Brooksby have tried product liability cases to verdict.  Their product liability practice includes, but is not limited to: aviation (aircraft and components), heavy equipment (including tractors, forklifts, loaders, logging equipment, and scissor-lifts), and industrial equipment used in the fabrication of raw steel and metals (including rollers, punch-presses, laser torches and other sample burners and test equipment).

Kristin Olson and Scott Brooksby also have experience with the following kinds of cases:

– Aviation, aircraft and their component parts.

– Paints, solvents, coatings, detergents, and pesticides, including benzene and toluene cases which resulted in liver and kidney transplants.

– Toys and recreational products, including paint ball guns, toys containing battery fire hazards, pogo sticks, pools, lead toys imported from India that were swallowed by children, toys allegedly containing lead paint, and inflatable and other recreational towables pulled behind boats.

– Tempered glass and conventional glass.

– Foreign objects or other alleged dangerous defects in food and drink products and packaging.

– Drug and medical device cases, including fraudulent vitamins and device replacements for hips, knees, ray cages and pedicle screws.

– Home appliance cases involving allegedly defective washers, dryers, stoves, heaters and heating equipment, green technology, and water heaters.

– Chemicals that resulted in a fatal automobile fire, burning a family of five, including fatal burns to two children.

The Consumer Expectation Test

Three types of product defects are recognized in Oregon: design defects, manufacturing defects, or failure to warn.  In any of these cases, to prevail on a product liability claim, the plaintiff must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous.  In design defect cases, risk-utility proof is not required to make a prima facie case.

Although Kristin Olson and Scott Brooksby have defended cases involving countless different types of consumer and other products, the test for liability in each case in Oregon is “the consumer expectation test” and this test is always the same.  It applies regardless of whether the case is a negligence case or a strict liability action.

Under the consumer expectation test, the question is whether the product was “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”  McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or 59, 77 (2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment I (1979)).  The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a product is unreasonably dangerous.

The consumer expectation test is objective.  Jurors may not consider their own personal subjective views as to whether the product contained conditions that they themselves would expect.  Similarly, they may not put themselves in the position of the injured plaintiff to make such a determination, but must apply the views of the community as a whole.  The McCathern decision also made clear that the consumer expectation test is the only test properly given to the jury in a strict product liability case.  For a good overview of Oregon product liability law, the McCathern decision is worth reading.

Who are Proper Defendants?

Strict tort liability applies to any person engaged in the business of selling or leasing products for use or consumption.  This includes manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, distributors, lessors, or in short, any person in the “stream of commerce”.  For a party to be held strictly liable in tort, that party must have sold or leased a product under the statute.  The Oregon product liability statute, codified at ORS 30.900 et. seq. provides that, “a manufacturer, distributor, seller or lesser of a product” may be subject to an action for a product that is unreasonably dangerous.  The Oregon Legislature did not adopt the caveat to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A caveat 3 (1965), which contains the caveat for component-part manufacturers.  The Oregon
Supreme Court has ruled that component part manufacturers can be subject to strict liability for the sale of defective components.  However, the manufacturer of a component part is not the subject of strict liability if the component was misapplied rather than defectively designed.

Important Considerations When Defending Products Cases in Oregon

One of the most important considerations at trial is jury selection.  What are the perspective jurors’ views of governmental regulation of the product involved and products generally?  Does the jury have preconceived attitudes and experiences that will make them favorable opinion leaders during jury deliberations, or do they have negative attitudes and opinions toward manufacturers or corporations that make them predisposed to award plaintiffs large verdicts no matter what the evidence?

Does one of the many defenses, including statute of limitations, statute of ultimate repose, alteration or unforeseeable misuse or modification apply?  Was the danger of the product so open and obvious, and an alternative unavailable such that the utility and necessity of the product outweighed any danger?  These and many other defense questions will require further analysis well before trial begins, and often before discovery begins.  Disciplined defense strategy formation and execution, exhaustive development of potential defenses, and jury research are all be valuable in attempting to obtain defense or low verdicts.

 

 

 

Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Act, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Consumer products, CPSA, CPSC, Defective Products, Litigation, Manufacturing, Personal Injury, Product Liability, Product recalls

Federal Government Regulation of Consumer Product Safety and Mandatory Reporting of Consumer Product Defects to the CPSC

Olson Brooksby frequently counsels local and national clients on whether or not the consumer products they manufacture or sell contain a safety defect that they would be required to report to the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Federal Regulation

The Congress of the United States established the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§2007-2089.

Complete analysis of the CPSA is beyond the scope of this article.  Pursuant to the CPSA, Congress established the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“Commission”) to regulate consumer product safety in the United States.  Under the CPSA, the Commission has the power to develop regulations related to the safety of consumer products, which are generally contained in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Under 15 USCS § 2052(5), a “consumer product” means “any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise…”

Specifically excluded from regulation by the CPSC are tobacco, motor vehicles, pesticides, aircraft and aircraft components, boats, drugs and medical devices and food.  Even if these excluded products are purchased for consumer use, they are not subject to regulation or jurisdiction by the CPSC.   The Commission does tend to heavily regulate consumer products, especially children’s items, such as: car seats, children’s pajamas, strollers, cribs, toys, some recreational products, certain home appliances, and tools.  The CPSC has passed specific regulatory acts such as the “Children’s Flammable Pajamas Act” associated with consumer products that target vulnerable users, primarily children and vulnerable adults.   A link to the CPSC website, which contains useful product safety information, including information for manufacturers such as current product recalls, is found at http://www.cpsc.gov/.

The Requirement of Reporting Consumer Product Defects to the CPSC

Although complete analysis of reporting requirements are beyond the scope of this article, Section 15(b) of the CPSA establishes reporting requirements (“Section 15(b) reports”) for manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers of consumer products.  In summary, each must notify the commission (generally within 24 hours) if they obtain information that “reasonably supports the conclusion” that a product (1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or with a voluntary consumer product safety standard, (2) fails to comply with any other rule, regulation, standard or ban under the CPSA or any other Act enforced by the Commission such as the Children’s Gasoline Burn Prevention Act, Refrigerator Safety Act or Flammable Fabrics Act, (3) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard, or (4) creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.

Under the CPSA, a private right of action exists for any person injured by violation of a consumer product safety rule promulgated by the Commission.  Manufacturers should be aware that the CPSA contains some sharp teeth and courts may award attorney fees as part of the injured person’s recovery.  15 U.S.C. §2072.  Under the CPSA, the CPSC has broad enforcement powers and a number of tools to ensure the safety of consumer products.  However, under the CPSA, the CPSC is also charged with assisting manufacturers, distributors and retailers of products with known defects in the development of a “Corrective Action Plan” (“CAP”), and although the CPSC enforcement powers have sharp teeth, the CPSC is also focused on working to develop voluntary corrective action plans and engaging in cooperation during corrective action plan implementation.

Olson Brooksby frequently counsels manufacturers on whether to pass along reports they have received or internally-developed information that suggests that a product may contain a defect that would require reporting under Section 15(b) of the CPSA.  While comprehensive analysis of the Section 15(b) reporting requirements are beyond the scope of this article, the Commission has published a useful abbreviated publication that discusses reporting and product recalls.

Why Familiarity And Compliance With CPSC Mandatory Reporting Requirements Matters

Although it should go without saying, manufacturers, especially those focused on products for babies, children and household consumers (such as cleaning products, flammable products, etc.), must be aware of whether the Commission is considering or has established specific rules governing their products.  Manufacturers, distributors and retailers should be aware of the basic reporting requirements to the CPSC under Section 15(b) if they become aware of information that reasonably supports the conclusion that their product contains a defect and should voluntarily report.

The Commission has the power to require mandatory recalls, but will typically offer a manufacturer the option of conducting a voluntary recall before issuing a recall order.  Prudent manufacturers of consumer products, especially those for which the Commission has promulgated specific rules or standards, should have a recall plan developed in advance because, whether voluntary or mandatory, the Commission will expect the company to commence the necessary recall action plan quickly and such plans are typically very involved.  Any action taken by the Commission, whether in the form of corrective action or a recall can have serious consequences for manufacturing cycles and the costs associated with a recall can be very high.  For more on this issue, please feel free to contact our office.